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ABSTRACT 
 
 
EVALUATION OF ATTENTION AND EXECUTIVE CONTROL WITHIN A  
 
MODEL OF Gf-Gc COGNITIVE FUNCTIONING 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
By 
 
Adam C. Scheller 
 
June 23, 2008 
 
 
 
Dissertation Supervised by Jeffrey Miller, Ph.D., ABPP 
 
 The Gf-Gc model (McGrew, 2003; McGrew & Flanagan, 1998) guided the 
development of most contemporary cognitive ability tests (Kaufman & Kaufman, 2004; 
Wechsler, 2003), as it enumerates general cognitive ability through the evaluation of its 
multiple components. This study involved an investigation of the Gf-Gc domains 
including added attention and executive control domains, which was measured by the 
Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children, 4th Edition (WISC-IV) and Conners’ 
Continuous Performance Test, 2nd Edition (CPT-II). These domains were compared via 
factor analysis of the WISC-IV and CPT-II.  
In addition, Structural Equation Modeling was used to test the structure of the 
Dean-Woodcock Neuropsychology Model (Dean et al., 2003), particularly the primacy of 
attention and the interaction of executive control with other cognitive skills. The current  
 
 v 
ABSTRACT (CONT.) 
 
 
study provided support for the addition of separate attention (Gat) executive control (Gec) 
components within a Gf-Gc cognitive model. In addition, a significant interaction was 
found between attention and processing speed, which supports attention as a primary 
cognitive skill.  
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CHAPTER 1  
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
1.1 Significance of the Problem 
 
The empirical evaluation of human cognitive functioning has intrigued our 
species for decades.  Dating back to the 1800’s, Francis Galton initiated the revolution of 
measuring human ability, including the ability to complete tasks that require intricate 
thinking skills (Plucker, 2003).  Throughout history the theories and methods for human 
cognitive evaluation have been developed and revised to include newer and more 
accurate components.  Currently, the Gf-Gc model (McGrew, 2003; McGrew & Flanagan, 
1998) guides the theory behind most cognitive ability tests (Kaufman & Kaufman, 2004; 
Wechsler, 2003), as it enumerates general ability through the evaluation of its multiple 
components. 
The main purpose of this study is to continue investigation of cognitive 
assessment, and in particular Gf-Gc theory.  While largely comprehensive, including 16 
stratum II (broad) and 99 stratum I (narrow) skills, the Gf-Gc theory does not account for 
a person’s ability to control subsystems, skills, and behaviors, or the ability of a person to 
attend to tasks.  The inclusion of executive control and attention components to this 
theory will further broaden the scope and thus improve the validity of contemporary 
cognitive assessment. 
Several contemporary studies (Duff, Schoenberg, Scott, & Adams, 2005; Floyd, 
Bergeron, & Hamilton, 2005; Keith, Goldenring Fine, Taub, Reynolds, & Kranzler, 2006; 
Naglieri, Goldstein, Delauder, & Schwebach, 2005; Wechsler, 2003) have analyzed the 
relationship between cognitive assessment, attention, and executive abilities, but none 
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have attempted to explore the possibility of a higher order processing relationship 
between cognitive skills that includes all of the current Gf-Gc components, as well as 
executive control and attention.  This study will attempt such an analysis in order to add 
to the vast lineage of human ability analysis. 
1.2 Processing  
Throughout his career A.R. Luria (1966, 1973, & 1980) investigated the brain’s 
involvement in complex behavior. He explained human cognition within three functional 
systems. These systems are associated with different anatomical regions in the brain. The 
first system controls arousal or cortical tone, which allows us to focus attention (Luria, 
1973). Luria associated the first system with the brain stem, diencephalon, and medial 
regions. The second system controls analysis, management, and storage of data input 
from the external world (Luria, 1966; Kaufman & Kaufman, 2004). The second system 
involves occipital, parietal, and temporal lobe regulation. Finally, the third system 
necessitates the planning and organization of behavior through hypothesis generation, 
planning, and self-monitoring (Das, Naglieri, & Kirby, 1994; Kaufman & Kaufman, 
2004; Luria, 1973). The third system is associated with frontal lobe regulation (Das et al., 
1994).    
Luria’s (1973) model of executive functioning (EF) is explained as a cognitive 
processing approach that follows a hierarchical organization of dominance within 
cognitive systems. Based on Luria’s (1966, 1970, 1973, & 1980) EF model, 
contemporary researchers have validated and extended the processing approach to 
cognition (Das, Naglieri, & Kirby, 1994; Kaufman & Kaufman, 2004; Naglieri, 1999; 
Reitan, 1988). Also, the importance of a reciprocal interaction, i.e. a “joint operation” 
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(Luria, 1970, pg 68.), between the first, second, and third cognitive systems has been 
highlighted (Das, Naglieri, & Kirby, 1994; Kaufman & Kaufman, 2004; Naglieri, 1999; 
Reitan, 1988).  In addition to the processing approach to cognition, another contribution 
of this cognitive processing approach is the supposition that attention to task takes 
primacy to other cognitive systems (Luria, 1973).   
On a similar token to Luria’s (1973) model of cognitive processing, Dean, 
Woodcock, Decker, and Schrank (2003) describe the Dean-Woodcock Neuropsychology 
Model. The Dean-Woodcock model explains human cognitive abilities as a process 
between higher and lower cognitive functions. The different levels of processing, from 
lower to higher, described in the Dean-Woodcock model are distinguished as reflexive, 
automatic, and thinking. Each of these levels function in a reciprocal interaction with 
each other, which represents a cycle of sensory input, processing, and output (Dean et al., 
2003). Although similar to Luria’s (1973) processing approach, Dean and colleagues 
(2003) provide a more detailed rationale for a hierarchy of skills. By introducing their 
theory of hierarchical processing, the Dean-Woodcock model sets the stage for the 
inclusion of executive functions and attention within a hierarchical cycle of higher and 
lower human functions. 
1.3 Executive Functioning 
The concept of executive functioning (EF) is a topic of continuing debate and 
revision. The debate does not exist to reject the existence of a higher-order human 
cognitive control system. Rather, research is focused upon what constitutes executive 
functioning and how to measure its component features. The neuroanatomical theory 
posed by Andrewes (2001) provides an overarching summary of skills completed within 
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a hierarchy of cognitive functions. The cognitive functions include: control, organization, 
concept formation, and problem solving, as well as attentional ability and certain qualities 
of personality.  
Andrewes’ (2001) neuroanatomical theory continues to include attention as an 
executive function. The theory proposed in this study eliminates attention as an executive 
function, and instead explains attention as a stand alone system under executive control 
(Baddeley, 2003; Meyer & Kieras, 1997) and having an intimate relationship between 
other cognitive systems (Luria, 1973).  
Naglieri, Goldstein, Delauder, and Schwebach (2005) completed a study 
investigating the correlation between a child’s attention (Conner’s Continuous 
Performance Test: CPT) and their performance on measures of intelligence (Wechsler 
Intelligence Test for Children, 3rd ed.: WISC-III; and Cognitive Assessment System: 
CAS). They found few significant correlations between the CPT and WISC-III, which 
suggests measures of attention and cognitive ability each hold unique variance. The 
Naglieri et al. (2005) study supports the analysis of attention as a separate factor affecting 
cognitive ability.  
Through this current study attention and the executive control mechanism 
regulating attention will be examined to determine their relationship with other 
predefined Gf-Gc cognitive components (McGrew & Flanagan, 1998; McGrew, 2003).  
As will be further explained in Chapter 2, the discussion of working memory will help 
advance the proposed theory of executive control and attention as separate, but 
functioning in a complex relationship of hierarchical processing (Baddeley, 2003; Dean 
et. al., 2003). 
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 Along with supporting theory for the separation of EF and attention, EF 
development in children is considered here in order to explain an EF hierarchy 
phenomenon. That is, EF develops in children with basic functions such as executive 
control first, followed by more complex higher order functions such as concept formation 
and problem solving (Anderson, 2002; Anderson, Anderson, Northam, Jacobs, & 
Catroppa, 2001; Goldberg & Bilder, 1987; Klenberg, Korkman, & Lahti-Nuuttila, 2001). 
For example, motor/impulse control is the first skill fully developed in children (Gioia, 
Isquith, Guy, & Kenworthy, 2000). As will be described further in Chapter 2, control is 
the necessary ability for all other executive functions to develop. It lays the basis for 
development of the higher-order skills (Barkley, 1997, 1999) such as concept formation 
and problem solving, and it is necessary for the proper regulation of attention (Posner & 
Peterson 1990).  
A hierarchy of cognition (Das, Naglieri, & Kirby, 1994) can be conceptualized 
with each higher-order skill dependent upon the efficient performance of the previously 
developed prerequisite skills. A hierarchical processing model conceptually holds 
executive control as a necessary, but not sufficient skill for the performance of higher 
order executive functions, such as concept formation, problem solving, and the executive 
control of attention.  
Support for a hierarchy involving concept formation and control was provided in 
a factor analytic study conducted by Minshew, Meyer, and Goldstein (2002), in which 
concept formation and concept identification were investigated in children with Autism. 
The authors demonstrated that the skill of identifying concepts was separate from abstract 
reasoning in children with Autism.  They also found that cognitive flexibility (control) 
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was an intermediate ability between identification and concept formation (Minshew et. 
al., 2002). Their study supports the notion of control as a precursor to concept formation.     
Duff, Schoenberg, Scott, and Adams (2005) determined that EF interacts with 
both immediate and delayed recall in a hierarchical relationship. Duff et al. (2005) 
conducted a canonical analysis of measures of executive functions and memory and 
found that EF and memory share 55-60% of variance. As a sidebar to their study, Duff et 
al. (2005) noted that despite a relationship being evidenced, directionality could not be 
determined. Their study supports the interrelatedness and reciprocal processing of EF and 
memory, which raises the question of the relationship between EF and all other cognitive 
systems. The lack of causality may support the postulation that EF and other cognitive 
functions act within an interrelated global system.   
Busch, Booth, McBride, Vanderploeg, Curtiss, and Duchnick (2005) completed a 
t-test analysis of the severity of executive dysfunction and performance on tasks of 
memory in subjects with head injury. They determined that memory was less related to 
executive dysfunction than overall cognitive dysfunction. However, when severity of 
cognitive dysfunction was controlled, memory and executive deficits were related based 
on the fluidity of the task. This finding indicates that tasks requiring executive cognitive 
fluidity were related to executive functions.  
 Neuroscience examinations of EF reveal frontal lobe involvement in higher-order 
cognition (Davies & Rose, 1999; Filley, Young, Reardon, & Wilkening, 1999; Goldberg, 
Podell, & Lovell, 1994; Goldman-Rakic, 1987; Luria, 1973; Rosenweig, Breedlove, & 
Leiman, 2002; Stuss & Benson, 1984). The frontal lobe of the human brain has been 
associated with the execution of EF and modulation of other brain systems, such as 
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attention (Stuss & Gow, 1992). A neurological disease such as Huntington’s Disease may 
offer a picture of what executive dysfunction involves. The frontal lobe atrophy caused 
by this disorder leads to deficits of executive functioning (Andrewes, 2001; adapted from 
Alexander, Crutcher and Delong, 1990; and Cummings and Coffey, 2000) such as 
disinhibition, dysfluency, and difficulty planning (Andrewes, 2001).  
Barkley (1997), in his description of executive function, identifies behavioral 
inhibition as the mediator for the competent performance of four executive abilities: 
working memory, internalization of speech, self-regulation of affect/motivation/arousal, 
and reconstitution (which explains goal directed behaviors of the motor system). 
Barkley’s model of Attention-Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder provides support for the 
argument of a hierarchy of EF investigated in this study, with control being necessary but 
not sufficient for higher executive skills.  
Another important executive system theory that supports a hierarchical cognitive 
process is called the Supervisory Attentional System (SAS) (Norman & Shallice, 1986). 
In this theory, the SAS acts as a mediator of sensory information and preexisting schemas 
when behavior is not automatic (Andrewes, 2001). Automaticity of behavior determines 
whether or not the SAS becomes involved. The SAS takes over behavioral control when 
(1) no preexisting schema is available for the stimuli, (2) two or more schemas are 
appropriate, (3) the strongest schema associated is inappropriate for the situation, or (4) 
the consequences of the wrong schema selection are dangerous. By defining the 
Supervisory Attentional System in this manner, which in itself is a key component to the 
executive attention system described by Andrewes (2001), Norman and Shallice (1986) 
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provide support for the separation of EF and attention. The complex relationship between 
EF and attention will be investigated further in the literature review of this study.   
The separation of control, concept formation, problem solving, and executive 
attention as distinct skills is supported by Luria’s (1973) description of executive 
functioning as the performance of goal directed behaviors, which can be viewed as a 
domain of possible outcomes from the control, planning, organization, and integration 
roles of more basic cognitive functions. Recall Luria’s (1973) model of executive 
functioning, which follows a cognitive processing approach and assumes the hierarchical 
dominance of cognitive modulation systems. Luria’s processing approach will be a 
foundational key in this research by supporting the interconnectedness of EF, attention, 
and other cognitive processes.   
A single domain score does not provide a valid account of EF because of the 
separation and distinction between skills that make up the construct (Messick, 1995). For 
example, although interrelated, concept formation and problem solving make up two 
different skills that are also measured differently (Delis, Kaplan, & Kramer, 2001). Often 
the measurement of a construct that includes several component skills is reported through 
an index or composite score.  For example, the Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children, 
4th ed. (WISC-IV) (Wechsler, 2003) reports an index named perceptual reasoning (PRI). 
The perceptual reasoning index is a composite of separate and distinct skills such as 
visual motor, visual concept formation, and visual discrimination. In contrast to viewing 
executive functioning as a single construct, research has indicated that the components of 
an EF domain reflect fundamental separate resources (Denkla, 1996; Boone, Ponton, 
Gorsuch, Gonzalez, & Miller, 1998).  
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1.4 Cattell-Horn-Carroll (current model) – Transformation into current theory 
Contemporary Gf-Gc theory (McGrew, 2003; McGrew & Flanagan, 1998) 
accounts for fundamental cognitive domain skills in its definition of the broad stratum II.  
Based on the Cattell-Horn-Carroll (CHC; name, 1993) integrated Gf-Gc model, McGrew 
(2003) explains a working definition of the CHC theory, which categorizes abilities into 
16 separate domains of functioning, called Broad (stratum II) domains. These broad 
definitions are further broken down into 99 Narrow (stratum I) definitions that account 
for comprehensive investigations of the factors that are included in stratum II domains. 
Gf-Gc theory explains cognition based on a comprehensive evaluation of multiple abilities 
(McGrew, 2003). 
 A discussion describing the comprehensive CHC theory of cognition is relevant 
to this study for the purpose of providing a framework for subsequent data analysis. The 
CHC theory has been couched as an all encompassing evaluation of human cognitive 
ability. Current intelligence tests for children base most of their measures on these broad 
and narrow CHC facets of cognition (Kaufman & Kaufman, 2004; Keith et al., 2006; 
Wechsler, 2003).  
McGrew (2003) is further investigating stratum II and stratum I in Gf-Gc 
cognitive ability through a working model, which is updated as relevant research is 
completed. Recent empirical evidence validates the broad abilities Gf, Gc, Gv, Gsm, Glr, 
Gs, Gq (quantitative knowledge), and Grw (reading/writing) as structural components of 
the model (McGrew, 2003). The presence of Gq and Grw reflects the integration of 
achievement into the CHC model.  
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In addition, Keith et al. (2006) completed a higher order confirmatory factor 
analysis of the Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children-Fourth Edition (Wechsler, 2003).  
Keith et al. (2006) challenged the WISC-IV (Wechsler, 2003) factor structure of verbal 
comprehension, perceptual reasoning, working memory, and processing speed by 
validating a factor model that resembles CHC cognitive structure.  Their study further 
validates the model in this investigation of the WISC-IV’s measurement of cognitive 
components.   
1.5 Where it’s going 
The application of the processing approach (Luria 1966a, 1966b, 1973, & 1980) 
within the component cognitive Gf-Gc model (McGrew, 2003) has been validated 
(Kaufman & Kaufman, 2004) and a hierarchical processing organization of cognition has 
been postulated (Dean et al., 2003); however, a cognitive organization that includes 
attention and EF (Goldberg, 1987) within that system has not been fully explored. Floyd, 
Bergeron, and Hamilton (2005) completed a joint exploratory factor analysis of subtests 
from the Delis-Kaplan Executive Function System and the Woodcock-Johnson III Tests 
of Cognitive Abilities to determine the relationship between executive functions and Gf-
Gc cognitive components. Their study determined that both EF and cognitive ability tasks 
measure the same general construct.  However, their explanation lacked a clear definition 
of EF skills, as well as an organization of each EF skill within an integrated model. Also, 
the analysis of this study did not take into account the processing relationship between 
cognitive systems (Dean et al., 2003) or the primacy of attention within the system 
(Luria, 1973).     
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1.6 Problem Statement 
The purpose of this study is to continue investigation of the Gf-Gc theory and 
expand the Keith et al. (2006) validation of Gf-Gc measurement by the WISC-IV.  A 
hierarchical processing organization, which may accurately explain the relationship 
between executive functions, should be applied to the inclusion of a new executive 
control (Gec) component and a separate attention component (Gat) within the Gf-Gc 
theory. We propose the necessary inclusion of executive control (Gec) and a separate 
attention factor (Gat), within a factorial organization of Gf-Gc cognitive measurement. 
This study involves an investigation of the Gf-Gc domains measured by Wechsler 
Intelligence Scale for Children, 4th Edition (WISC-IV) and Conners’ Continuous 
Performance Test, 2nd Edition (CPT-II). These domains will be compared via factor 
analysis of the WISC-IV and CPT-II. The WISC-IV, which measures Gf-Gc cognitive 
components (Keith et al., 2006; Wechsler, 2003), proposes the measurement of novel 
problem solving and concept formation; however, there is evidence that traditional 
intelligence testing does not appropriately evaluate executive functions, including 
executive control (Ardila, Pineda, & Rosselli, 2000).   
Also, the relationship of these cognitive components remains in question.  The 
hierarchical processing theory is supported by McGrew’s (2003) WJ III CHC 
Information Processing Model. In this model McGrew (2003) identifies processing speed 
and working memory as constructs that function separately and above or predictive of 
Spearman’s g (1927) and other stratum II cognitive components. The CHC Information 
Processing Model (McGrew, 2003) also provides support of a process between cognitive 
components in the Gf-Gc theory.   
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The second main purpose of this research is to test the structure of the Dean-
Woodcock Neuropsychology Model (Dean et al., 2003).  Given the fundamentals of 
cognitive processing proposed by contemporary research, questions arise as to the 
structural integrity of the Dean-Woodcock model.  In particular, Luria (1966, 1973, & 
1980) explained human cognition as the process between three systems, with primacy 
given to attention (Luria, 1973).  Also, working memory has since been validated as a 
process between short term memory, long term memory, and executive control 
(Baddeley, 2003), which is not accounted for by the Dean et al. (2003) model.  Therefore, 
the inclusion of Gec and Gat components questions the primacy of each component within 
the Dean-Woodcock (2003) model.  Analysis of the cognitive domains measured by the 
WISC-IV, and attention and executive control, as measured by the CPT-II, will shed light 
on the relationship between executive control, attention, and measures of cognitive ability 
in children. 
Below (Figure 1.1) is a preview of the modified Dean Woodcock 
Neuropsychology model, with attention added as a primary component, to be tested in 
this study.  This model guides the second step of this research study by providing a 
framework for analyzing the relationship between cognitive components.  The model will 
be further explained in Chapter 3, Variables and Models. 
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Figure 1.1 Modified Dean Woodcock Neuropsychology model, with attention added as a 
primary component 
 
 
Gec= Executive Control 
Gs=  Processing Speed 
Gat=  Attention 
Gsm=  Short Term Memory/Conscious Awareness 
Gf=  Fluid Intelligence 
Gv=  Visual Spatial Ability 
Gc=  Crystallized Intelligence 
1.7 Research Questions 
1. Are there additional components, in addition to Gf-Gc, that further explain 
cognitive functioning and processes? Confirming data would include the 
components Gf, Gc, Gs, Gv, and Gsm delineated in the Keith et al. (2006) 
literature, with the addition of attention (Gat) and executive control (Gec).  
a. Does executive control constitute a separate construct than is 
accounted for and measured by cognitive tests of Gf-Gc theory?  
 
Gat 
 
Gsm 
 
Gv 
 
Gf  
Stores of 
Acquired 
Knowledge 
(Gc) 
 
Gec 
 
Gs 
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b. Does attention constitute a separate construct than is accounted 
for and measured by cognitive tests of Gf-Gc theory? 
2. What is the structure of the relationship between attention, executive control, 
and CHC stratum II components measured by the WISC-IV? This model will 
be dependent first on verification of the presence of attention and executive 
control in research question #1. The second step of this question is dependent 
on the hypothesis that the components fit a model that is represented by 
Figure 1.1, with respect to Gf-Gc, and attention and executive control.  
a. Does the Dean Woodcock Neuropsychology Model (Dean et al, 
2003) accurately represent the relationship between cognitive 
components? 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 
2.1 Processing Theory 
Luria explained cognitive functioning as a process between cognitive systems 
(1966, 1973, & 1980).  The concept of processing between systems differs from the basic 
Gf-Gc (McGrew & Flanagan, 1998; McGrew, 2003) method, which analyzes separate 
abilities. Luria’s seminal works investigated the brain’s involvement in complex 
behavior. He explained cognitive processing within three functional systems that can be 
associated with separate anatomical brain regions. 
Luria’s (1973) first system includes the ability to sustain attention. The first 
system is the basis for the cognitive processing model. Attention is necessary for the 
performance of information acquisition and processing (Das, Naglieri, & Kirby, 1994).  
This system is associated with the brain stem, diencephalon, and medial regions. These 
brain regions are responsible for arousal and cortical tone, which affect the adequate 
maintenance of attention (Stuss & Benson, 1984).   
The second cognitive system is responsible for the integration of sensory input 
and complex planning/organizational skills (Kaufman & Kaufman, 2004; Reitan, 1988). 
This system accounts for cognitive memory functions, in that it is this system that 
controls the analysis, management, and storage of data input from the external world 
(Luria, 1966; Kaufman & Kaufman, 2004). The data integration and storage system is 
associated with temporal, frontal, cerebellar, hippocampal, and occipital lobe regulation 
(Rosenzweig, Breedlove, Leiman, 2002).  
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The final system involves the planning and organization of behavior, based on the 
data integrated and stored through the second system.  This organized behavior occurs 
through hypothesis generation, planning, and self-monitoring (Das et al, 1994; Kaufman 
& Kaufman, 2004; Luria, 1973). The third system is associated with frontal lobe 
regulation (Das et al., 1994; Reitan, 1988; Stuss & Benson, 1984). This executive 
functioning system also follows a cognitive processing approach, which conforms to a 
hierarchical organization of dominance within cognitive systems (Luria 1966, 1973, & 
1980). 
The processing approach to cognition (Das et al, 1994; Kaufman & Kaufman, 
2004; Naglieri, 1999; Reitan, 1988) is supported by current test construction, such as the 
KABC-II (Kaufman & Kaufman, 2004), and cognitive theory, such as the Dean-
Woodcock Neuropsychology model (Dean, Woodcock, Decker, & Schrank, 2003). The 
KABC-II and Dean-Woodcock theory are similar to Luria’s (1966, 1973, & 1980) model 
of cognitive processing, which identifies the importance of a reciprocal interaction 
between the first, second, and third cognitive systems (Das, Naglieri, & Kirby, 1994; 
Kaufman & Kaufman, 2004; Luria, 1970; Naglieri, 1999; Reitan, 1988). 
The Dean-Woodcock Neuropsychology Model (Dean et al., 2003), explains 
human cognitive abilities as a process between higher and lower cognitive functions. The 
Dean-Woodcock model discriminates from lower to higher skills as reflexive, automatic, 
and thinking. The skills function in a reciprocal interaction similar to Luria’s (1966, 
1973, & 1980) explanation of the first, second, and third cognitive systems.  The Dean et 
al. (2003) model represents a cycle of sensory input, processing, and output. Although 
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similar to Luria’s (1973) processing approach, Dean and colleagues (2003) provide a 
more detailed rationale for a hierarchy of skills. 
Dean et al. (2003) advocate for a hierarchy of skills within an information-
processing model. While sensory and motor functions are analyzed at input and output 
levels (reflexive), they set the stage for the effective performance of “thinking” level 
skills. The Dean-Woodcock Neuropsychology model explains that novel reasoning 
cannot occur without first activation of the sensory register, and then conscious 
awareness. Following conscious awareness, the analysis of stimuli occurs (through 
tactile-kinesthetic thinking, visual-spatial processing, and/or auditory processing). The 
long-term storage-retrieval ability is then stimulated prior to active transformation of 
stimuli to an output answer, also known as novel reasoning. This process is differentiated 
from “automatic,” for which no active thinking is necessary.  Examples of “automatic” 
processes are those over-learned skills with which we are fluent.   
Dean et al. (2003) note that cognitive performance, motor output, and conscious 
awareness of stimuli cannot occur without passing through an executive control system. 
The executive control system includes motivation/volition, cognitive style/temperament, 
and emotional state. The executive control system acts as a gatekeeper directing the path 
of automatic versus non-automatic/novel processes. This system is also responsible for 
allocation of attention and monitoring of performance. Dean et al. (2003) include 
executive control in their model of cognitive processing, but they explain EF as solely a 
control mechanism with personality features. This model is similar to Barkley’s (1997 & 
1999) explanation of the behavioral and cognitive dyscontrol found in children with 
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ADHD. The construct of executive control will be investigated further in the Executive 
Functioning section of this chapter.    
Kaufman and Kaufman (2004) developed The Kaufman Assessment Battery for 
Children, Second Edition (KABC-II) as a contemporary cognitive battery that begins to 
explore the union of Luria’s (1966, 1973, 1980) processing theory and the Gf-Gc model 
of human cognition (McGrew & Flangan, 1998). The theoretical approach to developing 
the KABC-II is consistent with the focus of this study. The KABC-II provides a piece of 
evidence for cognitive processing within a field of study that lacks such investigation. 
While the application of the processing approach (Luria 1966a, 1966b, 1973, & 1980) 
within the component cognitive Gf-Gc model (McGrew, 2003) has been validated 
(Kaufman & Kaufman, 2004), a hierarchical organization of EF (Goldberg, 1987) within 
that system has not been fully explored.   
2.2 Executive Functioning 
A neuroanatomical perspective of Executive Functioning (EF) explains a system 
including five sub-domains: (1) control; (2) organization, synthesis, judgment (OSJ); (3) 
attention; (4) planning, sequencing, monitoring (PSM); and (5) personality (Andrewes, 
2001). This five dimension definition of EF incorporates multiple founding theories in 
the area. This neuroanatomical definition will be a key theory for understanding EF this 
research study, because it includes and explains the fundamental variables being studied. 
Andrewes (2001) definition of EF is differentiated from the Dean et al. (2003) 
explanation of executive control, and Barkley’s (1997, 1999) model of behavioral and 
cognitive dyscontrol, because it includes problem solving and concept formation as 
component skills instead of viewing them as separate constructs.   
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 Control, OSJ, PSM, Attention, and Personality are dependent on each other and 
function based on a hierarchical processing system. Theories of hierarchical cognitive 
functions have been postulated (Duff, Schoenberg, Scott, & Adams, 2005), which assume 
frontal lobe executive control is critically involved in the hierarchical model (Goldberg & 
Bilder, 1987; Stuss & Benson, 1987). The study conducted by Duff et al. (2005) 
completed a canonical correlation of executive functions and memory, and determined 
that EF and memory share 55-60% of variance. A limitation noted by Duff et al. (2005) is 
that despite a relationship being evidenced, directionality could not be determined. This 
lack of causality may further support the postulation that EF and cognitive functions act 
within an interrelated global system.  
Investigators have attempted to refute a hierarchical EF model (Varney & 
Stewart, 2004); however, their relationship did not include executive control as a 
foundational component. Rather, Varney and Stewart (2004) defined EF as planning and 
problem solving of verbal and nonverbal tasks. Their research did, however, support the 
definition of EF as a multi-component system as opposed to a single domain score.  
As posed in this study, control is the necessary function for the performance of 
other “higher level” skills, such as concept formation, problem solving, and insight. One 
must possess the ability to control cognitive, attention, motor, and limbic systems in order 
to execute dependent skills properly (Barkley 1997, 1999). Goldberg and Bilder (1987) 
explain that the hypothesis of hierarchical cognitive control assumes two requirements. 
First, sequential organization allows for a dependent relationship between any operation 
and the output of the prior operation; and second, previous stages of the cognitive skill 
include more general types of the desired skill. Within the hierarchical processing model 
 20 
of EF, the base begins with control, followed by concept formation and problem solving, 
and ending with features of personality. The ability to form concepts and problem solve 
are dependent on the necessary performance of executive cognitive control. While social 
organization and motivational components are subsumed as an executive skill, this study 
focuses on cognitive skill rather than personality. For the purposes of this research study 
personality features will not be included; however, application of a hierarchical 
processing analysis between cognitive EF, personality EF, and component cognitive 
skills may be an important area of future research.   
A hierarchical processing model can provide explanation for common executive 
deficits found in children with ADHD. Barkley (1997 & 1999) describes ADHD as a 
disorder marked by global dyscontrol. If a child with ADHD is lacking basic cognitive 
and behavioral control, then it would serve logical that their higher order executive 
functions would be negatively affected. To find support for this theory, one may look to 
the common measures used for the evaluation of ADHD in children. Measures of verbal 
learning, self-regulation, sequencing, mental flexibility, response/behavioral inhibition, 
planning, organization, attention, and working memory (Antshel & Waisbren, 2003; 
Barkley, 1997; de Jong & Das-Smaal, 1995; Seidman et. al., 2001; Wecker et. al., 2000) 
have been employed in batteries used to assess Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorders 
(ADHD) in children (Antshel & Waisbren, 2003; de Jong & Das-Smaal, 1995; Seidman 
et. al., 2001; Wecker et. al., 2000). The assessment of ADHD is important in the 
understanding of EF, because ADHD is characterized by categorical executive 
dysfunction (Mattson et at, 1999). 
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2.2.1 Sub-domains of Executive Functioning 
2.2.1.1 Control (Flexibility) 
Control refers to a person’s ability to vary inhibition of multiple system functions, 
including cognition, emotion, language, attention, motor movements, and memory 
(Andrewes, 2001; Stuss & Benson, 1987). Flexibility of control is a subset of inhibition, 
and therefore is subsumed under control (Andrewes, 2001). The concept of control over 
novel situations, of which there is no preexisting schema, is a fundamental function of the 
prefrontal cortex (Goldberg, Podell, & Lovell, 1994). Flexible control describes how a 
person inhibits or disinhibits perceptual, cognitive, and response elements (Lezak, 1995), 
based on information from a feedback loop (Andrewes, 2001). The feedback loop is an 
automatic self-monitoring system that determines whether or not the amount and type of 
control resulted in the desired outcome. This loop is based on sensory feedback from the 
environment or mechanisms such as biofeedback. Deficit in executive flexibility results 
in perseverative and dysfunctional cognition, perception, or response (Lezak, 1995). 
Studies have also shown that intact flexibility is positively related to increased 
internalization of attributions for desired or positive situations (Garcia, Torrecillas, de 
Arcos, & Garcia, 2005). 
 A distinction can be made between control that is voluntary (effortful) versus 
control that is less than voluntary or reactive (Eisenberg, Spinrad, Fabes, Reiser, 
Cumberland, Shepard, Valiente, Losoya, Guthrie, & Thompson, 2004).  Linked to 
anterior cingulate gyrus involvement (Posner & Rothbart, 1998), effortful control 
explains voluntary and flexible modulation of attention and activation or inhibition of 
behavior. Eisenberg et al. (2004) demonstrated the direct positive relationship between 
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effortful control and impulsivity with externalizing behavior, and the indirect relationship 
with internalizing problems; however, their research noted the distinct impact of effortful 
control and impulsivity to outcomes. Conclusions form the Eisenberg et al. (2004) study 
note that children with low impulsivity do not spontaneously attempt new problem 
regulatory strategies; and children with low effortful control may not be able to manage 
negative emotional states.  Thus, it can be predicted that children with low levels of either 
effortful control or impulsivity will have low levels of resiliency, possibly increasing the 
risk of internalizing problems (Eisenberg et. al., 2004). The addition of effortful control 
to the explanation of EF is important to better detail the impact of control on human 
behavior, cognition, and emotion.   
2.2.1.2 Organization, Synthesis, Judgment (Concept Formation) 
Andrewes’ (2001) OSJ describes the function of a person’s concept formation. 
Concept formation is the ability to categorize and compare current information and/or 
experience with previous learning or experience (Andrewes, 2001). In short it explains a 
person’s capacity for abstracting universal or rational concepts (Wang, 1987). Concept 
formation is also responsible for a person’s ability to make socially acceptable or 
situation based judgments. One must address new information in relation to their 
knowledge base (Murphy & Allopenna, 1994) and determine how it fits with their 
preexisting schemas (Andrewes, 2001). For example, concept formation deficits in 
children with Autistic Disorder have been examined (Minshew, Meyer, & Goldstein, 
2002), which account for their difficulty generalizing learned social skills to novel social 
situations.   
 23 
The skill of concept formation is believed to be housed in the frontal lobes 
(Wang, 1987). It is not affected by level of education, and it follows a specific 
developmental pattern (Wang, 1987). Development of concept formation skills in will be 
discussed further in the development section of this chapter.   
2.2.1.3 Planning, Sequencing, Monitoring (Problem Solving) 
Inherent in executive functioning is optimal performance of goal directed 
behaviors (Luria, 1973). The neuroanatomical perspective describes planning, 
sequencing, and monitoring as necessary for a person’s ability to problem solve 
(Andrewes, 2001). It is the ability to plan goal oriented behavior, and self monitor the 
problem solving process. This skill is necessary for the identification and organization of 
the process and components necessary to achieve a goal (Lezak, 1995). A person can self 
monitor via a cognitive and sensory feedback loop. From this feedback a person must 
determine if their course is appropriate for the task and modify accordingly (Andrewes, 
2001). Deficit in self-correction and self-monitoring may result from an inability to 
perceive mistakes, or inaction to correct such mistakes (Lezak, 1995). 
Newman, Carpenter, Varma, and Just (2003) explain that the prefrontal cortex is 
involved in the function of problem solving. They go on to explain that while there is bi-
hemispheric involvement in planning, a necessary component of problem solving 
(Andrewes, 2001), the left and right prefrontal cortices are involved in different stages of 
planning. Newman et al. (2003) conclude that the right prefrontal cortex may be more 
involved with the generation of a plan, and the left prefrontal cortex may be more 
involved in the execution of a plan. As will be described further in the biological basis 
section of this chapter, the Newman et al. (2003) conclusion mirrors the novelty-
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routinization approach to frontal lobe functions (Goldberg, Podell, & Lovell, 1994), 
which indicates that novel problem solving is a right frontal lobe function.   
2.2.1.4 Personality 
The executive manifestation of personality is comprised of drive, social skills, and 
insight (Andrewes, 2001). Drive refers to initiation to undertake a task. Persons with 
frontal lobe damage can exhibit decreased drive, which can result in an inability to 
initiate activities or carry through on a task (Andrewes, 2001; Lezak, 1995).  
Impaired social skills can also occur following severe focal frontal lobe damage. 
This deficit presents as a person being socially inappropriate, not being able to form 
social strategies, and not being able to synthesize social feedback (Andrewes, 2001). A 
deficit in social competence can present as crude behavior, or a lack of understanding and 
recognition of social norms and mores. Impaired social awareness may result in extreme 
forms of politeness (Lezak, 1995).  
Insight relates with the ability to compare one’s characteristics, emotions and 
social adaptation, to those of others, and in turn modulate one’s behavior and adapt 
socially (Andrewes, 2001; Prigatano, 1991). This capacity of self-awareness includes 
both the awareness of physical status and the awareness of situational and environmental 
contexts (Lezak, 1995).  
2.3 Attention 
Attention refers to a person’s ability to distribute their focus, also called divided 
attention, to different tasks, while simultaneously avoiding situational intrusions 
(Andrewes, 2001). The attention component has been left out of the hierarchical 
processing model of executive functioning, because attention doesn’t follow conceptually 
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with the idea of executive skill. However, attention does include an executive component 
and components of attention are included in the cognitive processing model proposed in 
this research. For example, Posner and Peterson (1990) described the executive control 
system as including control functions of attention such as divided attention, selective 
attention, sustained attention, and alertness. Therefore all facets of attention are not 
controlled by executive functioning; rather the overarching concept of attention is 
modulated by EF. Attention is an important feature of this research and it will be 
investigated as existing in a relationship (Luria, 1973) with executive control (Posner & 
Peterson, 1990; Meyer & Kieras, 1997) and Gf-Gc (McGrew & Flanagan, 1998; McGrew, 
2003) cognitive components.  
Support for the separation of attention and Gf-Gc cognitive components was 
provided by studies showing need for the focused assessment of attention (Naglieri, 
Goldstein, Delauder, & Schwebach, 2005; Manly, Anderson, Nimmo-Smith, Turner, 
Watson, & Robertson, 2001).  In the Naglieri et al. (2005) study, attention, as measured 
by the Conners’ Continuous Performance Test (CPT), and cognitive ability, as measured 
by the Wechsler Intelligence Test for Children-3rd ed. (WISC-III), were found not to 
share significant variance. The lack of significant correlations between the CPT and 
WISC-III suggests unique variance for each measure.  Similarly, Manly et al. (2001) 
found that sustained attention, selective attention, and attentional control are not directly 
measured by WISC-III prorated IQ or the vocabulary, similarities, block design, or object 
assembly subtests. These studies support the investigation of EF, Gf-Gc cognitive 
components, and attention as separate constructs.   
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2.3.1. Andrewes’ Theory of Executive Attention 
 Andrewes (2001) explains four systems of attention: the arousal system, orienting 
system, perceptual system, and executive attention system (Posner & Peterson, 1990). 
Each of these four systems is responsible for different functions related to attention. The 
arousal system is broken down into two types: tonic arousal and phasic arousal. Arousal 
is directly influenced by the ascending reticular activating system (ARAS) with sensory 
information being passed through the thalamus. The thalamus is responsible for 
regulation of sensory information available to brain systems (Andrewes, 2001).  
Tonic arousal refers to arousal involved in the daily cycles of sleep and 
wakefulness, and the ability to be awakened and maintain wakefulness (Andrewes, 2001; 
Stuss & Benson, 1984). Tonic arousal is influenced by the suprachiasmic nucleus (SCN). 
The SCN is situated above the optic chiasm with neuronal projections stemming from the 
optic nerve. The SCN has access to information regarding environmental light. The SCN 
has a direct role in regulating circadian rhythm, and thus the varying levels of arousal 
throughout the day (Andrewes, 2001). Severe pathology of tonic arousal is akinetic 
mutism. This disorder is characterized by an intact sleep-wake cycle, but little cognitive 
function (Stuss & Benson, 1984). The other end of the spectrum describes “drifting 
attention”. In this case, attention can be given to a stimulus, but is quickly reverted back 
to a lethargic or sleepy state (Stuss & Benson, 1984).   
Phasic arousal is considered more variable than tonic arousal because it is 
determined by environmental events (Stuss & Benson, 1984). “Fight or flight” is a 
metaphor used to describe the physiological attention response to dangerous 
environmental stimuli. Phasic arousal is affected by hypothalamic influence. The 
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hypothalamus is responsible for the mediation of emotion and drive, or hunger, in 
relation to environmental events. When dangerous stimuli are identified, one becomes 
alerted by hormones released through the adrenal glands, or ARAS. A disorder in which 
tonic arousal is intact, but thalamic (phasic) functions are deficient is characterized by 
alertness and cooperation with an inability to suppress external stimuli (Stuss & Benson, 
1984). In this case, external stimuli are easily distracting.  
The orienting reflex response is the attentional component of phasic arousal. This 
is seen as simply changing attention to a stimulus of appeal. The orienting reflex is in 
response to novel stimuli (Andrewes, 2001). It is a curiosity for unfamiliar events or 
objects. The reflexive structured control of eye movements in response to stimuli is 
accounted for by the orienting system. Eye movements are oriented to stimuli via a 
pathway involving the superior colliculus (SC). The SC acts as a mediator of sensory 
information, sensory eye fields, motor systems, executive control, and the eye in order to 
orient attention to a specific novel stimulus (Andrewes, 2001). Habituation occurs when a 
stimulus is no longer novel, and doesn’t elicit the orienting reflex.  
The perceptual attention system is responsible for selective attention based on 
preferential concentration to stimuli of relative importance (Andrewes, 2001). A common 
example of the function of this system is the cocktail party phenomenon. If a person is at 
a cocktail party and they are engrossed in a conversation that demands their attention, 
then they may not hear a person across the room calling their name. If that same person is 
involved in a boring or uninteresting conversation, their name or other words of interest 
spoken across the room may get their attention. The perceptual attention system allows a 
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person to perceive important stimuli despite attending to something else (Andrewes, 
2001).   
Andrewes (2001) describes the executive attention system as having specific 
control of the inhibition of the reflexive orienting response. Forms of attention mediated 
by the executive attention system include focused attention, sustained attention, divided 
attention, and attention shifting. Focus involves capacity for attention and the ability to 
attend selectively to stimuli. Sustained attention specifically involves vigilance to task. 
Sustaining attention and remaining alert affect the ability to complete a task effectively. 
Divided attention refers to the simultaneous use of information, which allows for the 
manipulation and integration of multiple sets of stimuli. Attention shifting involves the 
cognitive control of the attentional system. Divided attention is most affected by acute 
frontal lobe injury or diffuse brain injury affecting the frontal-brainstem control pathway 
(Stuss & Gow, 1992). Cognitive flexibility allows attention to be shifted between sets 
based on feedback or changing classification requirements (Andrewes, 2001).  
The Andrewes (2001) model of attention follows true to cognitive processing 
theory. Each attention component functions in an interdependent relationship of cause-
effect-modulation.  For example, sustained attention is a task associated with the 
executive attention system. However, the processing of the attention system (Das, 
Naglieri, Kirby, 1994) indicates that for the proper execution of sustained attention the 
arousing, orientating, and perceptive systems must function properly. Cognitive 
processing and the hierarchical model of cognition are common themes in this research. 
Andrewes (2001) supported this process approach through evidence of the cause-effect-
mediation relationship of attention.  
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2.3.2. Posner and Peterson Three Factor Theory of Attention 
In a seminal work on the attention system, Posner and Peterson (1990) delineated 
three basic characteristics of human attention.  First, the attention system can be 
identified as separate from other cognitive systems in the brain. Second, attention 
functions within a network, as opposed to a single center or a general brain function.  
Third, within the attention system, different regions perform different functions.  Posner 
and Peterson (1990) explain the three functions as orientation, signal detection, and 
vigilance. 
In a contemporary examination of attention in children, Manly et al. (2001) 
provided support for Posner and Peterson’s (1990) explanation of three functions within 
the attention system.  Manly et al. (2001) applied the Structural Equation Modeling 
(SEM) approach to data from a child sample that was given a contemporary attention 
battery (Test of Everyday Attention for Children) executive functioning measures, and a 
measure of cognitive ability.  The SEM indicated the best fit for a model of attention in 
children including selective attention, attentional control/switching, and sustained 
attention.  In addition to Manly et al. (2001) providing support for Posner and Peterson’s 
(1990) three separate attention functions, the nonsignificant relationships they found 
between attention factors and other cognitive tasks provide support for attention 
components as additional skills separate from typical Gf-Gc cognitive components.   
2.3.3. Norman and Shallice Theory of Attention 
Norman and Shallice (1986) explain the difference between routine behavior and 
behavior requiring executive involvement. Routine behavior involves three steps: sensory 
activation of schemas; the selection of appropriate, or “best match”, schemas given the 
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stimuli; and ending with the execution of a behavior program. The Norman and Shallice 
(1986) model is investigated to provide a basis for the fractionation of attention and EF.   
Routine behavior is considered automatic and not in need of executive 
involvement. Behavior can be considered automatic following a number of different 
criteria. Hasher and Zacks (1984) list six criteria for automaticity: encoding without 
deliberate effort; incidental encoding; no effects of training or practice; small individual 
differences; small to no age differences between children, adults, and elderly; and 
information is not disrupted by simultaneous attention-demanding tasks. The model of 
behavioral control (Norman & Shallice, 1986) involves the use of a contention scheduler 
to associate stimuli with appropriate schemas.  
The Supervisory Attentional System (SAS) explains the function of the control of 
cognitive functions in order to navigate a new task. If the contention scheduler cannot 
find a preexisting schema, there is more than one appropriate schema available, the 
strongest schema is inappropriate given the situation, or the consequences of a wrong 
schema selection are dangerous, then the SAS becomes involved to adapt and integrate 
components of previously learned information and the novel task (Norman & Shallice, 
1986). 
The explanation of the executive attentional system bares resemblance to the 
Norman and Shallice (1986) model of executive functioning. The executive attentional 
system allocates resources to specific functions depending on the need of an organism. 
The SAS defines it as non-automatic behavior, but this can be translated into behavior 
that is novel or requires additional cognitive resources. The SAS model provides support 
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for the disconnection of EF and attention, and further explains the executive modulation 
of attention.  
2.4 Executive Memory (Working Memory) 
The cognitive component of memory is inclusive of sensory, working, and long 
term memory. Executive functions serve as a modulator between the three types of 
memory, but neither is independent of the other three. A model of multiple theoretical 
views describes working memory as a function of the phonological loop (composed of 
the phonological store and articulatory loop), central executive, visuo-spatial sketchpad 
(composed of the visual cache and inner scribe), and episodic long term memory buffer 
(Baddeley & Hitch, 1974; Baddeley, 2003). The central executive in this model refers to 
executive modulation of attention (Baddeley & Hitch, 1994) and accounts for the 
“working” component of working memory.  
A comparison has been made between the current working memory model and 
multi-component cognitive Gf-Gc theory (Baddeley, 2003). An individual’s episodic 
long-term memory, acquired language, and visual semantics account for crystallized 
skills that are referenced to provide the foundation for novel problem solving. The visuo-
spatial sketchpad, episodic buffer, and phonological loop are fluid systems of Gf related 
abilities. The central executive is a separate regulatory system that controls cognition and 
behavior based non-automatic cognitions or behaviors (Baddeley, 2003). 
Baddeley (2003) makes the comparison of Gf-Gc with the fluid and crystallized 
systems of working memory, with central executive functions apparent as a separate 
collaboration. The correlation of working memory and Gf-Gc components is clear, with 
executive functioning as a separate additional component (Baddeley, 2003). Additionally, 
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Duff, Schoenberg, Scott, and Adams (2005) found that working memory shares more 
variance with learning and memory than with executive functions. This study provided 
support for the separation of executive functions and working memory. A comprehensive 
psychometric analysis, which includes the neuroanatomical executive functioning 
components as separate skills from the basic Gf-Gc broad domains, provides productive 
foundation for the relationship between cognition and the hierarchy of executive 
functions (Baddeley, 2003).  
2.4.1. Theories of Working Memory 
Baddeley and Hitch (1974) pioneered a model of working memory in terms of the 
central executive modulation and integration of various slave systems. The model of 
working memory has undergone significant development since Baddeley and Hitch 
proposed the model of central executive modulation of various slave systems and long 
term memory in 1974. The slave systems involved in working memory are the visuo-
spatial scratch pad and the phonological loop. The phonological loop is responsible for 
processing auditory information and maintaining it to allow for mental manipulation. The 
visuo-spatial is comparably responsible for visual and nonverbal information. Each of 
these systems is dependent on a person’s memory capacity. As information/data is being 
maintained in each of these slave systems, the central executive coordinates the processes 
of integrating and correlating the information with episodic long-term memory and 
regulates attention resources (Baddeley & Hitch, 1994). Components of information 
being addressed in working memory require continued reference to the long term 
memory, and the episodic buffer performs this task.  
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 A progressive model of working memory breaks the phonological loop into 
phonological store and articulatory loop. The phonological store accounts for auditory 
memory span, and the articulatory loop controls the rehearsal and maintenance of the 
memory. This model also breaks the visuo-spatial sketchpad into the visual cache and 
inner scribe. The visual cache controls the passive storage of visual memories, and the 
inner scribe is an active system that controls a person’s memories for spatial positioning 
and movements. The central executive in this model is responsible for the allocation of 
resources/attention (Baddeley & Hitch, 1994) to each of these slave systems and the 
meditation of stimuli with visual and language episodic long-term memory. 
The exact definition of executive functioning is a somewhat elusive topic. The 
debate is partially due to the poly-connectivity of brain systems and the possible 
directionality of control. Many brain systems are dependent or related in function to each 
other. It is because of this interdependent relationship that the pathway of control has not 
been solidified.  
2.5. Development of Executive Functioning in Children 
Children experience three major “growth spurts” in executive function between 
the ages of 0-5 years, 7-9 years, and 11-13 years (Anderson, 2002). Children as young as 
12 months exhibit goal directed problem solving behavior, and as young as 18 months 
exhibit self control to maintain an action or inhibit a behavior (Gioia, Isquith, Guy, & 
Kenworthy, 2000). Skills emerging from 0-5 years may include the ability to inhibit 
certain behaviors and shift to a new response, the ability to voluntarily modulate attention 
(Luria, 1973), the ability to inhibit instinct behaviors (Klenberg, Korkman, & Lahti-
Nuuttila, 2001), the emergence of simple advanced planning skills, the emergence of 
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simple conceptual reasoning and generation of new concepts, the ability to rapidly switch 
between simple response sets, and an increase in response speed and verbal fluency 
(Anderson, 2002). Motor inhibition and impulse control are seen as the skills first fully 
developed, approximately by age 6 years (Klenberg, Korkman, & Lahti-Nuuttila, 2001). 
Although attentional control begins to develop around 2 years of age, a child’s 
behavior continues to be highly perseverative until the third and fourth years of age 
(Posner & Rothbart, 1998). Also between 3 and 4 years old, the accuracy of a child’s 
responses to tasks that require inhibition of a prepotent response increases dramatically 
(Posner & Rothbart, 1998), with continued improvement of inhibition into adulthood 
(Durston, Thomas, Yang, Ulug, Zimmerman, & Casey, 2002). This increase in accuracy 
for selective inhibition tasks marks the development of effortful control in children 
(Eisenberg et. al., 2004; Posner & Rothbart, 1998).  
While younger children can make decisions, their decisions tend to require more 
time and are not as sophisticated as those made by older children and adolescents. Also, a 
child begins to acquire the ability to learn from their mistakes and develop alternate 
strategies, with mastery of this skill by 8 years of age (Anderson, 2002). Children as 
young as 8 years old can perform tasks of frontal lobe functioning at some level (Davies 
& Rose, 1999).  
 Between the ages of 7 to 9 years children increase their ability to deal with multi-
dimensional switching tasks, planning and organization skills rapidly develop (between 7 
and 10 years), and strategic and reasoning behaviors become more efficient (between 7 
and 11 years). A significant burst in processing speed also becomes apparent from 
approximately 9 years until 10 years old (Anderson, 2002).  
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 During the development from 11 until 12 years old, a child’s processing speed 
experiences another significant increase. Also at this time, self-regulation and strategic 
decision making abilities change. There can be seen a regression from the use of 
conceptual strategies to utilization of more conservative and cautious “piecemeal” 
approaches. A child’s information processing, cognitive flexibility, and goal setting are 
basically mature by 12 years old. Also, at 12 years the neuroelectric activity in the 
dorsolateral prefrontal area is fully mature (Davies & Rose, 1999). A person’s EF 
development does not end with the critical period of 13 years old, but continues to 
emerge the refinement of strategies, improved decision-making, increased efficiency and 
fluency (Anderson, 2002), and concept formation (Wang, 1987).  
 It has been suggested that a person’s frontal lobe develops on a different timeline 
than other brain regions. Davies and Rose (1999) found that versus parietal lobe 
development, cognitive performance skills that are dependent on frontal lobe activity take 
longer and are more significant when they develop. As can be noted from the 
developmental progress of executive functions, EF develops in spurts rather than a linear 
progression (Anderson, 2002; Gnys & Willis, 1991).  
 Anderson et al. (2001) studied the development of executive functions in 
adolescence. They employed neuropsychological tests of several EF sub-domains in 
order to determine developmental progression of these skills. This study assumed 
attentional control, cognitive flexibility, and goal setting as separate components of EF. 
The developmental progression of EF skills is relatively flat during this time, as 
compared to the significant spikes or spurts (Anderson, 2002) evident during early and 
middle childhood. Attentional control undergoes another significant increase around 15 
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years of age, accounting for an increase in attentional capacity and processing speed 
(Anderson et al., 2001). This study found that cognitive flexibility is likely already 
mature by the time a child reaches adolescence. They found no significant increases in 
this EF component during adolescence. Goal setting, which subsumes initiating, 
planning, problem solving, and strategic behaviors, steadily improves until 12 years of 
age and is likely fully developed by this time. Despite improvements in attentional 
control and planning, adolescence does not offer hallmark changes in EF (Anderson et 
al., 2001).  
 Wang (1987) describes concept formation as “last to appear, first to disappear” 
(pg 10). He explains that concept formation begins to develop in puberty and continues 
throughout adulthood.  Concept formation progressively matures through most of 
adulthood, but may begin to show decline as early as 40 years of age (Wang, 1987).   
2.6. Biological Basis of Executive Functioning 
Structural damage to the dorsolateral frontal lobe regions of the brain has been 
implicated in executive functioning deficits. This brain region has been implicated in 
mediating executive functions in children as young as 8 years old. Children with damage 
to the dorsolateral frontal region have demonstrated more EF impairment than did 
children with damage to either the medial or orbital frontal regions (Filley et al., 1999). 
However, the frontal connectivity to other brain systems is well documented (Stuss & 
Benson, 1984), and these systems are thereby regulated by a person’s executive 
functions. The pathways between these systems, or the systems of interest, are also 
implicated in executive functioning deficits (Gioia, Isquith, Guy, & Kenworthy, 2000).  
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Goldman-Rakic (1987) explained that a possible reason why children experience 
continued improvement in their cognitive abilities, into adulthood, may be because of the 
elimination of synapses, continued myelin formation, changes in the regulation of 
neurotransmitter receptor synthesis and maintenance, and modification in the 
biosynthesis of neurotransmitters and peptides. Davies and Rose (1999) attributed frontal 
lobe development to progressive maturational stages. In an analysis of variance for 
performance on tasks measuring frontal lobe (executive) functions versus tasks associated 
with parietal functions, Davies and Rose (1991) determined that performance on 
neuropsychological tasks of frontal lobe function showed more significant increases as a 
child progressed through maturational stages, than did performance on tasks associated 
with parietal lobe functioning.  
Goldberg, Podell, and Lovell (1994) caution against the interpretation of lateral 
executive functions as verbal versus nonverbal. They describe the novelty-routinization 
approach as the differential between left and right frontal lobe functions. The right frontal 
cortex is responsible for the processing of novel or unfamiliar cognitive demands. They 
describe the left frontal cortex as involves the processing of routine or preexisting 
knowledge (Goldberg, Podell, & Lovell, 1994). This theory breaks down the verbal – 
nonverbal barrier in that it assumes right hemispheric involvement in the acquisition of 
language, a novel task in young children. Similarly, contemporary research describes plan 
generation as a right prefrontal function, while plan execution is largely a left prefrontal 
task (Newman et al., 2003).  
Rosenweig, Breedlove, and Leiman (2002) describe dysexecutive, disinhibited, 
and apathetic type syndromes associated with prefrontal cortex injury. Dysexecutive type 
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syndrome, associated with the dorsolateral region of the brain, results in diminished 
judgment, planning, insight, and temporal organization; cognitive impersistence; motor 
programming deficits; and diminished self care. A person with a disinhibited type 
syndrome, which is associated with dysfunction of the orbitofrontal region, may exhibit 
stimulus driven behavior, diminished social insight, and emotional lability. Finally, the 
apathetic type syndrome, resulting from damage to the mediofrontal region, includes 
diminished spontaneity, diminished verbal output, diminished motor behavior, urinary 
incontinence, lower extremity weakness and sensory loss, diminished spontaneous 
prosody, and increase response latency.  
The dorsolateral region is responsible for the cognitive aspects of executive 
functioning. While the orbital and medial areas are related to the behavioral 
manifestations of executive function (Anderson, 2002).  
One of the most visible systems affected by the frontal lobe executive control is 
the motor system. Deficits are apparent in following significant damage to the prefrontal 
convexity and orbital areas of the prefrontal lobes. Prefrontal convexity damage, 
otherwise known as hypokinesis, results in retarded motor movement that seems to lack 
initiative. Orbital damage, otherwise known as hyperkinesis, results in impulsivity and 
restlessness that may present itself as an inability to sit still and make effective motor 
movements (Stuss & Benson, 1984).  
Luria (1973) also described motor deficits in terms of lesions localized to pre-
motor areas, and massive damage to or pathology of the frontal motor areas. Pre-motor 
region damage/pathology results in an inability to stop the successive repetition of a 
motor action. This action is seen as a compulsive repetition of preinitiated actions (Stuss 
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& Benson, 1984). Pre-motor functions differ slightly from frontal motor functions, in that 
frontal motor damage can result in repetition of a motor action in the presence of 
different instructions (Stuss & Benson, 1984). 
Another role Stuss and Benson (1984) explain as controlled by the frontal lobes is 
sensory-perceptual function. Unilateral sensory neglect and unilateral inattention 
phenomenon are characteristic of frontal lobe lesions. Unilateral sensory neglect is 
characterized by an inability to attend to a sensory field with damage to the opposite 
frontal lobe. This inability follows a spectrum of severity and can range from minimal 
neglect to severe sensory defect (Stuss & Benson, 1984). Unilateral inattention 
phenomenon is described as the inability to report bilateral stimuli in spite of being able 
to report separate unilateral stimuli in both visual fields (Stuss & Benson, 1984). 
Subcortical structures for circuitry pathways in people with Huntington’s and 
Parkinson’s disease have been identified. Both disorders have significant executive 
dysfunction sequelae, and it is important to acknowledge these syndromes to form an 
understanding of EF. The first circuit is described as the Dorsolateral Circuit and is 
responsible for executive dysfunction in Huntington’s and Parkinson’s disorders. The 
circuit is as follows: convexity of the frontal lobe, dorsolateral head of the caudate 
nucleus, globus pallidus and substantia nigra, and then medial dorsal thalamic nuclei and 
ventral anterior. This pathway then circles back to the convexity of the frontal lobe 
(Andrewes, 2001; adapted from Alexander, Crutcher and Delong, 1990 and Cummings 
and Coffey, 2000).  
The second circuit, named the orbitofrontal circuit, is responsible for emotional 
and social dysfunction in these disorders. The circuit begins with the inferior lateral 
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prefrontal cortex, then the inferior caudate nucleus, the pallidum and substantia nigra, and 
finally the medial portions of the ventral anterior and medial dorsal thalamic nuclei, 
before returning to the inferior lateral prefrontal cortex (Andrewes, 2001; adapted from 
Alexander, Crutcher and Delong, 1990 and Cummings and Coffey, 2000).  
The final circuit, anterior cingulated circuit, is responsible for akinetic mutism, 
apathy, lack of drive and focus of attention. This circuit begins in the cortex of the 
anterior cingulated gyrus (Brodmann’s area 24), then to the ventral or limbic striatum, 
nucleus accumbens, ventomedial portions of the caudate and putamen, and finally the 
medial thalamic nuclei before returning to the cortex of the anterior cingulated gyrus 
(Andrewes, 2001; adapted from Alexander, Crutcher and Delong, 1990 and Cummings 
and Coffey, 2000).  
2.7. Executive Functioning as it Relates to Attention-Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder 
The DSM-IV-TR (2001) defines Attention-Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder 
(ADHD) as a childhood disorder that may include inattention, impulsive behavior, and/or 
hyperactive behavior. ADHD is broken down into three subtypes by the DSM: ADHD, 
Combined Type; ADHD, Predominantly Inattentive Type; and ADHD, Predominantly 
Hyperactive-Impulsive Type. ADHD is a behavioral disorder characterized by specific 
observable behavioral and social deficits. Even though ADHD is diagnosed through 
observable behaviors, specific cognitive deficits are hallmark.  
 Barkley (1999), a key researcher in the area of childhood ADHD, explains that 
children with ADHD exhibit a deficient ability to inhibit responses. Response inhibition 
involves three processes: inhibition of initial response prior to the event, stopping an 
ongoing response during an event, or controlling interference during an event to ensure 
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proper completion. Excessive activity level, or hyperactivity, is due to a child’s 
impulsiveness or inability to inhibit motor action (Barkley, 1999). Children with ADHD 
have significant trouble conforming to behavioral restriction despite specific instructions 
from their environment (Barkley, 1999). Inhibitory defect can also be seen as an inability 
to delay gratification, and an inability to resist temptations (Barkley, 1999).  
 Children with ADHD have demonstrated significantly lower performance on the 
Wisconsin Card Sorting Test, Verbal Fluency (F-A-S, animals, and fruits) and Picture 
Arrangement (WISC-R), which supports the theory that children with ADHD have 
deficits in executive functioning (Chelune & Baer, 1986; Pineda, Ardila, Rosselli, 
Cadavid, Mancheno, & Mejia, 1998). Children with ADHD have deficient performance 
on both the phonetic and categorical sections of verbal fluency tests, but they tend to 
display more significant deficit on the phonetic section (Pineda, Ardila, Rosselli, 
Cadavid, Mancheno, & Mejia, 1998).  
Children with ADHD perform significantly worse than non-ADHD children on 
measures of executive function such as the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test, tests of Verbal 
Fluency, and the Picture Arrangement subtest of the Wechsler series of intelligence tests. 
This supports the idea that children with ADHD display executive dysfunction (Pineda, 
Ardila, Rosselli, Cadavid, Mancheno, & Mejia, 1998).  
Children with ADHD have significantly more difficulty on cognitive tasks of 
flexibility and abstract categorization than do children without ADHD. Also, children 
with ADHD tend to make errors on tasks, such as Picture Arrangement, that are common 
in persons with frontal lobe damage (Pineda, Ardila, Rosselli, Cadavid, Mancheno, & 
Mejia, 1998).  
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ADHD has characteristics similar to prefrontal injury (Benton, 1991). 
Specifically, ADHD and hyperactivity involve dysfunction of the prefrontal cortex 
(Benton, 1991). A difference exists between prefrontal injury and ADHD in the 
functioning of visuo-perceptive and visuo-analytic capacity. These skills are largely 
intact with prefrontal injury, but can be dysfunctional in children with ADHD (Benton, 
1991). 
2.8. Executive Functioning Conclusion 
In order to complete a proper analysis of the complex nature of EF, time must be 
spent describing its component parts, development, and biological causation. Through 
investigation of the neuroanatomical perspective of EF, several key components were 
identified: control, cognitive flexibility, problem solving, and personality characteristics 
such as drive, social skills, and insight. These components comprehensively explain the 
specific executive functions that are not directly related to the executive modulation of 
other brain systems.  
Some contemporary theories of executive functioning include components that 
are dependent on the proper execution of other systems or skills. For example, the 
execution of attention and working memory is dependent on the proper functioning of 
several brain systems. Attention requires a person to have intact arousal system, orienting 
system, perceptual system, and executive attention system. Dysfunction in any one 
system will cause a person to experience symptoms of inattention. As well, working 
memory is dependent on the functioning phonological loop (composed of the 
phonological store and articulatory loop), central executive, visuo-spatial sketchpad 
(composed of the visual cache and inner scribe), and episodic long term memory buffer 
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(Baddeley & Hitch, 1974). As is the case with attention, dysfunction with any one 
component will affect a person’s working memory ability. 
The basic concept of EF development in humans explains the theory of 
hierarchical executive skill development. The first executive skill to develop in children 
is the ability to control impulses and motor movements (Klenberg, Korkman, & Lahti-
Nuuttila, 2001). This control skill sets the groundwork for what proves to be a 
hierarchical processing order of executive functions. As control is the first to develop, 
some of the last EF skills mastered include planning, goal setting, concept formation, and 
judgment. Those skills that are the most complex and difficult to master prove to be those 
that are most severely affected by dysfunction at the lower levels of the hierarchy.  
In conclusion to this executive functioning concept and research synthesis, EF 
assessment measures can prove to be useful tools for the understanding of what 
constitutes executive ability. The D-KEFS is an example of a contemporary assessment 
battery that employs a processing approach to EF, and attempts to account for all of the 
contributing factors to successful executive functioning. It breaks down the necessary 
skills for successful completion of a task and separates EF from brain systems that 
contribute to task completion. This process allows researchers and clinicians to remove 
the contribution that non-EF skills have on the EF performance. The result is a purer 
understanding of how executive abilities and other related systems contribute to a 
person’s functioning levels across domains.  
2.9. Cattell-Horn-Carroll Model of Cognitive Ability 
  According to McGrew (2003) the working definition of the Cattell-Horn-Carroll 
(CHC) theory of cognition categorizes abilities into 16 separate domains of functioning, 
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called the Broad (stratum II) definitions. These broad definitions are further broken down 
into Narrow (stratum I) definitions that account for comprehensive investigations of the 
factors that are included in stratum II domains. 
 Fluid Intelligence/Reasoning (Gf) describes the ability to solve novel or non-
mastered problems (McGrew, 2003; McGrew & Flanagan, 1998).  The skills necessary 
for fluid reasoning often include processes such as problem solving, concept formation, 
and classification. Measured factors that load on this subcategory include general 
sequential reasoning, induction, quantitative reasoning, Piagetian reasoning, and speed of 
reasoning (McGrew, 2003).  
 Crystallized Intelligence/Knowledge (Gc) describes a person’s acquired 
knowledge of the language and specific nuances of culture, and/or the application of this 
knowledge (McGrew, 2003). Gc is the store of verbal declarative and procedural 
knowledge. Variance contributing to Gc includes language development, lexical 
knowledge, listening ability, general information, information about culture, 
communication ability, oral production and fluency, grammatical sensitivity, foreign 
language proficiency, and foreign language aptitude (McGrew, 2003; McGrew & 
Flanagan, 1998).  
 General (or domain-specific) Knowledge (Gkn) describes the extent of a person’s 
acquired knowledge in specialized domains (McGrew, 2003). Gkn typically does not 
represent experiences of a person’s particular culture. Factors such as knowledge of 
English as a second language, knowledge of signing, skill in lip reading, geography 
achievement, general science information, mechanical knowledge, and knowledge of 
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behavioral content are measures of the variance in Gkn (McGrew, 2003; McGrew & 
Flanagan, 1998).  
 Visual Spatial Abilities (Gv) describes the set of abilities that accounts for the 
different processes involved in the generation, storage, retrieval and transformation of 
visual stimuli. Gv tasks require the accurate perception and mental transformation of 
spatial orientation tasks. Measures that make up Gv include visualization, spatial 
relations, closure speed, flexibility of closure, visual memory, spatial scanning, serial 
perceptual integration, length estimation, perceptual illusions, perceptual alternations, and 
imagery.  
 Ga is the acronym for auditory processing. This subcategory explains an 
individual’s ability to control the perception of auditory information (McGrew, 2003). It 
involves a variety of abilities necessary for the discrimination of sound, and the analysis, 
manipulation, comprehension, and synthesis of sound. Phonetic coding, speech sound 
discrimination, resistance to auditory stimulus distortion, memory for sound patterns, 
general sound discrimination, temporal tracking, musical discrimination and judgment, 
maintaining and judging rhythm, sound-intensity/duration discrimination, sound-
frequency discrimination, hearing and speech threshold factors, absolute pitch, and sound 
localization are all factors included in Ga (McGrew, 2003).  
 Gsm, short-term memory, describes the ability to capture and maintain stimuli 
from the immediate situation (McGrew, 2003). CHC theorists (McGrew, 2003) generally 
explain Immediate as recall within one minute of exposure to stimulus. Memory span and 
working memory are included as factors of Gsm. Working memory is maintained in this 
interpretation of CHC theory despite being driven by theoretical development and not as 
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an individual differences factor (McGrew & Flanagan, 1998). This is explained further in 
the section describing the theories of working memory.  
Long-term storage and retrieval (Glr) describes the ability to encode information 
with fluent post retrieval of the information. Two major types of Glr include the ability to 
fluently retrieve information from long term storage over minutes or hours, which 
McGrew (2003) describes as intermediate memory, and fluency of retrieval with days, 
months, or years since encoding. A correlation has also been drawn between the Gf-Gc 
concept of Glr and the long-term memory buffer explained in Baddeley and Hitch’s 
(1974) theory of working memory (McGrew & Flanagen, 1998). Glr differentiates 
between the ability to retrieve stored facts, reproductive process, and the ability to 
produce material from previously learned rules or information. Glr includes twelve 
narrow factor definitions. Included are the ability to associate pairs of information, 
rapidly and fluently produce words based on phonemic or categorical clue (McGrew & 
Flanagan, 1998), and the ability to draw figures based on visual stimulus rapidly and 
fluently. Glr does not dissociate between verbal and nonverbal tasks, but accounts for the 
appropriate consolidation of information and accurate manipulation of memory.  
 Cognitive processing speed (Gs) refers to the speed with which one can accurately 
perform tasks that are considered relatively routine or automatic. The Gs narrow 
definition includes speed of reading and writing, the speed with which one can take a test 
of routine tasks, visual perceptual and scanning speed, and the speed of accurate 
performance of basic numerical operations.  
 McGrew (2003) also describes the time needed to make a decision as a broad 
categorical definition (Gt). On a basic level Gt is the ability to make decisions quickly 
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given simple stimuli (McGrew, 2003). Gt is explained by reaction to a single stimuli, the 
choice between two or more alternative stimuli, the processing of a decision that requires 
mental manipulation or comparison of characteristics, and the time it takes to identify 
changes or characteristics of stimuli based on limited exposure to that stimuli.  
 Rapid and fluent motor movements that are independent of cognitive control (Gps) 
are accounted for by the CHC theory. A typical Gps task involves goal directed hand, 
finger, or leg movements in the presence of a speed requirement.  
 Quantitative knowledge (Gq) accounts for the breadth and depth of learned 
quantitative knowledge (McGrew, 2003). Mathematical knowledge involves the storage 
of declarative and procedural math facts. Math facts are generally measured on tests of 
math achievement. 
 Similar to Gq, Reading and writing (Grw) also accounts for the breadth and depth 
of declarative and procedural knowledge. Grw describes reading and writing skills in 
terms of reading decoding, reading comprehension, verbal language comprehension, 
cloze ability, spelling ability, writing ability, English usage knowledge, and speeded 
reading and writing fluency. Reading speed is also loads on Gs, and writing speed on Gs 
and Gps. Gq and Grw reflect the integration of achievement into the Gf-Gc theory (McGrew 
& Flanagan, 1998). 
 The final broad stratum II definition is psychomotor ability (Gp). Gp is the ability 
to perform motor movements with precision, coordination, or strength (McGrew, 2003).  
Measures that load on this domain include static strength, multilimb coordination, finger 
and manual dexterity, arm-hand steadiness, control precision, aiming, and gross body 
equilibrium.  
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 Olfactory abilities (Go), Tactile abilities (Gh), and Kinesthetic abilities (Gk) are 
included in McGrew’s (2003) working definition of the CHC model of cognitive ability, 
but they have not as of yet been thoroughly investigated. Go refers to abilities that depend 
on olfactory sensory receptors. Each category describes sensory sensitivity in each area, 
with the inclusion of olfactory memory.  
Table 2.1  
Table of stratum I and II abilities incorporated in the CHC expansion of the Gf-Gc 
cognitive model. All sixteen stratum II abilities are subsumed under one stratum I ability, 
labeled as “g” (adapted from McGrew, 2003). 
Stratum II Stratum III 
Fluid Intelligence (Gf) 
General Sequential Reasoning 
Induction 
Quantitative Reasoning 
Piagetian Reasoning 
Speed of Reasoning 
Crystallized Intelligence (Gc) 
Language Development 
Lexical Knowledge 
Listening Ability 
General Information 
Information about Culture 
Communication Ability 
Oral Production and Fluency 
Grammatical Sensitivity 
Foreign Language Proficiency 
Foreign Language Aptitude 
General Knowledge (Gkn) 
Knowledge of English as a second language 
Knowledge of signing 
Skill in Lip-reading 
Geography Achievement 
General Science Information 
Mechanical Knowledge 
Knowledge of Behavioral Content 
Visual Spatial Abilities (Gv) 
Visualization 
Spatial Relations 
Closure Speed 
Flexibility of Closure 
Visual Memory 
Spatial Scanning 
Serial Perceptual Integration 
Length Estimation 
Perceptual Illusions 
Perceptual Alternations 
Imagery 
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Auditory Processing (Ga) 
Phonetic Coding 
Speech Sound Discrimination 
Resistance to Auditory Stimulus Distortion 
Memory for Sound Patterns 
General Sound Discrimination 
Temporal Tracking 
Musical Discrimination and Judgment 
Maintaining and Judging Rhythm 
Sound-Intensity/Duration Discrimination 
Sound-Frequency Discrimination 
Hearing and Speech Threshold Factors 
Absolute Pitch 
Sound Localization 
Short-term Memory (Gsm) 
Memory Span 
Working Memory 
Long-term Storage and Retrieval (Glr) 
Associative Memory 
Meaningful Memory 
Free Recall Memory 
Ideational Fluency 
Associational Fluency 
Expressional Fluency 
Naming Facility 
Word Fluency 
Figural Fluency 
Figural Flexibility 
Sensitivity to Problems 
Originality/Creativity 
Learning Abilities 
Cognitive Processing Speed (Gs) 
Perceptual Speed 
Rate of Test Taking 
Number Facility 
Speed of Reasoning 
Reading Speed-fluency 
Writing Speed-fluency 
Decision/Reaction Time or Speed (Gt) 
Simple Reaction Time 
Choice Reaction Time 
Semantic Processing Speed 
Mental Comparison Speed 
Inspection Time 
Psychomotor Speed (Gps) 
Speed of Limb Movement 
Writing Speed-fluency 
Speed of Articulation  
Movement Time 
Quantitative Knowledge (Gq) 
Mathematical Knowledge 
Mathematical Achievement 
Reading/Writing (Grw) 
Reading Decoding 
Reading Comprehension 
Verbal-printed Language Comprehension 
Cloze Ability 
Spelling Ability 
Writing Ability 
English Usage Knowledge 
Reading Speed-fluency 
Writing Speed-fluency 
Psychomotor Abilities (Gp) Static Strength 
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Multilimb Coordination 
Finger Dexterity 
Manual Dexterity 
Arm-hand Steadiness 
Control Precision 
Aiming 
Gross Body Equilibrium 
Olfactory Abilities (Go) 
Olfactory Memory 
Olfactory Sensitivity 
Tactile Abilities (Gh) Tactile Sensitivity 
Kinesthetic Abilities (Gk) Kinesthetic Sensitivity  
 
 
2.10. The Development of the CHC Model of Cognitive Ability 
 The CHC model underwent major developments during throughout its history 
leading to the contemporary version. A continuum of progress proposing significant 
theoretical, measurement and assessment developments is suggested by McGrew (2004). 
 The development of the CHC model began with Spearman’s g/s factor theory. 
Spearman’s two-factor theory poses a correlation between general intelligence (g) and 
specific factors (s). These two factors were thought to explain for the relationship 
between measures of sensory discrimination. It is fitting that the roots of a theory based 
on factor analysis begin with the g/s factor theory, because Spearman has been credited 
for introducing factor analysis to cognitive theory.  
 The British Tradition began by analyzing the g-factor and then grouping smaller 
factors based on breadth. This theory posed a hierarchical theory of g and its “subfactors” 
(McGrew, 2003). It suggested that most of the variance of intelligence was made up of g 
and to a lesser extent the small group factors.  
The American Tradition does not readily identify a g-factor. This led to the 
formation of second order factors. Thurstone’s Primary Mental Abilities (PMA) theory 
(1938) separated seven to nine abilities that were essentially independent of the factor g. 
This was the beginning of the differentiation between fluid (Gf) and Crystallized (Gc) 
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intelligence. Factor analysis of the first order definitions led to second order definitions 
explaining Gf and Gc. After this development, the WERCOF abilities were recognized, 
which suggested 60 possible cognitive abilities (McGrew, 2003). 
Following early development of psychometric theory, specific research on the Gf-
Gc theory provided an extension to the existing factors. Additional broad G-factors were 
included in the model. They were Gv (visuo-spatial abilities), Gsm (short-term memory), 
Glr (long-term storage and retrieval), and Gs (cognitive processing speed). The additional 
G-factors were supported by factor analytic, developmental, genetic, neurocognitive, and 
outcome-criterion evidence research (McGrew, 2003). There was additional support for 
eight broad abilities and a hierarchical structural model of intelligence (Gustafasson, 
1984). At the time that research was supporting the existence of these additional factors, 
there was no test battery that reflected the theory. This disparity is referred to as a theory-
to-applied measurement practice gap. The hierarchical framework was based on the 
suggestions that Gf was equivalent to “g”, which essentially placed Gf at the top of the 
pyramid.  
The WJ-R battery (Woodcock & Johnson, 1989) was the first clinical assessment 
of cognitive ability that was based on the Gf-Gc theory. This assessment specifically 
aimed at closing the theory-to-applied measurement practice gap. Through factor analysis 
of the WJ battery, independent researchers (Horn, Carroll, Woodcock, and McGrew) 
design the WJ-R, which measures nine broad abilities.  
Following this major advancement in the assessment of cognitive ability, other 
well known intelligence batteries (DAS, DTLA-3, KABC, SB-IV, and WISC-
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R/WAIS/WAIS-R) were classified at the broad Gf-Gc level. This cross-battery assessment 
further verified the construct evidence for the Gf-Gc theory.  
Carroll’s (1993) three tier hierarchical model of cognitive ability included an 
overarching g-factor, which was defined by breadth of generality. The developing model 
of ability included narrow, broad, and general levels. To this point Cattell and Horn’s 
model differed from Carroll with respect to the presence of a g-factor. Empirical evidence 
from the use of WJ-R norm data supported the existence of Carroll’s three levels of 
ability, and also the presence of intermediate abilities, which exist between the three 
levels.  
Emerging empirical data lead to a merging of the theories and the classification of 
intelligence batteries into narrow and broad ability levels. It sparked investigations into 
the definitions of broad and narrow abilities. A formalized cross battery confirmatory 
factor analytic (CFA) approach was applied to major intelligence assessments for 
classification of abilities (Phelps, McGrew, Knopik, & Ford, 2005). The Phelps et al. 
(2005) CFA used the Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children, 3rd edition (WISC-III) 
and the Woodcock Johnson Test of Cognitive Abilities, 3rd edition (WJ-III) to confirm 
Gf-Gc broad domains and narrow abilities. The WISC-III and WJ-III load heavily on five 
stratum II domains (Gc, Gq, Gs, Gsm, Gv), and additionally the Ga, Gf, and Glr domains 
load only on the WJ-III assessment.  Phelps et al. (2005) indicates that the fourth edition 
of the Wechsler intelligence series (WISC-IV; PsychCorp, 2004) may represent the 
addition of Gf, Ga, and Glr domains.   
As the investigations of this theory continue, empirical evidence validates the 
broad abilities Gf, Gc, Gv, Gsm, Glr, Gs, Gq (quantitative knowledge), and Grw 
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(reading/writing) as structural components of the CHC model. The presence of Gq and 
Grw reflects the integration of achievement into this model. The continuing study of this 
theory can account for the validation of the sixteen broad level abilities. As this working 
model of cognitive ability continues to develop, stratum II and stratum I will continue to 
be refined through empirically validated psychometric evidence. The purpose of this 
research is to continue this investigation. The inclusion of executive functions and 
attention is relevant to the development of CHC cognitive theory. 
2.11. Relationship between Executive Functioning and Cognitive Ability 
Executive functioning, when defined as a skill describing responses to the 
inhibition of confounding variables for the integration, organization, and maintenance of 
attention and memory (Wecker et. al., 2000), has been linked to Global Fluid Intelligence 
(Gf) (de Jong & Das-Smaal, 1995), academic achievement, a child’s placement in special 
classes, a child’s need for tutoring assistance, and grade retention (Seidman et. al., 2001). 
Deficits in executive functioning for children aged 8-17 years with brain lesions, as 
measured by the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test (WCST), were found not to be related to 
general cognitive impairment as measured by the VIQ and FSIQ (Filley et al, 1999). 
However, in a population of normal children with above average to very superior IQs, 
performance on the WCST was found to vary based on IQ level (Arffa, Lovell, Podell, & 
Goldberg, 1998). Arffa et al. (1998) found that children with very superior IQs 
outperformed peers with above average to superior IQs on the WCST.  This study 
suggests a link between “higher level conceptual functions” (pg. 718) in children and 
measures of IQ.   
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Generally, psychometric intelligence has been found to be intact following insult 
to the frontal lobes or pathology following disease (Benton, 1991). Specific skills 
measured by conventional intelligence tests are not included in the deficits found in the 
disabilities of frontal or pre-frontal injury (Benton, 1991). Mattson et al (1999) found that 
for children with fetal alcohol exposure, there is no significant correlation between 
intelligence and executive functioning; however they do note that this finding may have 
been due to the small sample size of their study. Low intelligence does not account for all 
of the deficit variance found in children with fetal alcohol syndrome and prenatal 
exposure to alcohol, because of their deficits in executive functioning (Mattson et al, 
1999).  
Scores on Word Context tests have been found to be correlated with intelligence, 
but deficits on Word Context measures may not be accounted for primarily by executive 
dysfunction (Mattson et al, 1999).  
Research involving adult neurological patients has demonstrated that people with 
focal frontal lobe damage often perform normally on tests measuring IQ and other basic 
skills, such as reading and spelling tests (Delis, Kaplan, & Kramer, 2001). Tests 
measuring IQ have correlations between .20 and .40 with tests of higher-level EF tests 
(Ardila, Pineda, & Rosselli, 2000). This means that only about 4-16% of the variance for 
EF tests is accounted for by measures of IQ and basic level achievement (Delis, Kaplan, 
& Kramer, 2001). Ardila, Pineda, and Rosselli (2000) found that performance on the 
WCST, as a measure of concept formation and executive functions, is not highly 
correlated with performance on the WISC-R. Their conclusions support the postulation 
that IQ tests are not sensitive to executive control and planning.  As well, Murji and 
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DeLuca (1998) found that FSIQ from the WISC-III was not a factor in overall 
performance on the Tower of London, as a task of planning and problem solving, for 
children aged 6 to 15 years with FSIQ greater than 80.  
The relationship between ADHD, IQ, and executive functions has been analyzed 
by many previous studies (Barkley, 1990; Crinella & Yu, 2000; Duncan et al., 1995, 
1996; Goldstein, 1987; Priftera & Dersh, 1993; Schwean, Saklofske, Yackulic, & Quinn, 
1993; Swanson, 1997; Wechsler, 1991). The thought is that measures of fluid intelligence 
have a higher correlation to psychometric “g” than do conventional measures of general 
intelligence (Duncan et al., 1995, 1996), such as FSIQ (Wechsler, 2003) and global 
composite index. Frontal lobe lesions have been found to affect a person’s executive 
functions, but they may not affect fluid intelligence (Crinella & Yu, 2000). Regardless, 
most tasks that measure cognitive ability require some level of executive processing or 
control (Anderson, 2002). 
Mahone, Hagelthorn, Cutting, Schuerholz, Pelletier, Rawlins, Singer, and Denkla 
(2002) investigated the correlation of EF measures and IQ in children with and without 
ADHD. Their findings suggest that children with ADHD demonstrate larger deficits on 
tasks of executive functioning than do normal children when IQ is in the average range. 
However, children with IQs in the high average or superior range, with/without ADHD, 
could not be discerned on EF task performance alone. The authors noted that a child’s IQ 
score accounted for more variance in EF than did the diagnosis of ADHD. This supports 
IQ as a moderator variable for children with ADHD (Mahone et al., 2002). It also further 
supports the complex interaction of executive functions and component cognitive abilities 
being analyzed in this study.  
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2.12. Literature Review Conclusion 
In conclusion to this literature review, it is imperative to recognize the complexity 
and interrelatedness of cognitive systems. Cognitive processing theories explain the 
interrelated nature of brain systems (Luria, 1973), as well as their hierarchical nature 
(Dean et al., 2003). Previous factor analytic studies support additional separate EF factors 
(Boone et al., 1998) within a cognitive system; and correlational studies indicate that tests 
of intelligence for children are not sensitive to executive abilities (Ardila, Pineda, & 
Rosselli, 2000).  
The joining of processing and skill based theories is proposed in this research 
study, based on an extensive review of current literature. Utilizing contemporary state of 
the art assessments for each component, the theory that executive control, attention, and 
component cognitive skills function within a reciprocal processing hierarchy will be 
tested. The procedure for this proposal will be enumerated in Chapter 3 of this study.     
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CHAPTER 3  
METHOD 
 
The methods chapter presents a description of the participants, instruments used, 
and procedure for statistical analysis involved in this study. This study utilizes an 
exploratory factor analytic design to evaluate executive control, attention, and the Gf-Gc 
cognitive components measured by contemporary measures of attention and cognitive 
abilities in children.  Based on literature research analysis (refer to Chapter 2), prior 
studies identified Crystallized Intelligence (Gc), Fluid Reasoning/Concept Formation 
(Gf), Visual-Spatial Skills (Gv), Conscious Awareness/Short-term memory (Gsm), and 
Processing Speed (Gs) factors (Keith et al., 2006) as measured by the WISC-IV test of 
intelligence. This study proposes the addition of attention (proposed Gat) and Executive 
Control (proposed Gec) into a child cognitive factor structure.   
 Also, in addition to the exploratory factor structure analysis, a structural equation 
model will be formed to test the relationship between factors.  In particular, components 
of the Dean-Woodcock Neuropsychology Model (Dean et al., 2003) will be tested. 
3.1 Participants 
 Data for this study were collected from an ongoing database of patients referred to 
the Allegheny General Hospital Department of Psychiatry for a neuropsychological 
evaluation. Subject data analyzed consisted of 225 children aged 6 to 16 years.  
Determination of the minimum required sample size for structural equation model 
analysis was completed prior to subject selection.  Based on the Schumacker and Lomax 
(1996) proposal of 10 subjects per variable, the proposed sample of this study, 225 
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subjects for 15 observed variables, is adequate for analysis.  The age range has been 
defined between 6 to 16 years in order to follow the age restrictions for the Wechsler 
Intelligence Scale for Children, 4th Edition (6 to 16 years) (Wechsler, 2003) and Conners’ 
Continuous Performance Test-II (6 years and up) (Conners & MHS Staff, 2002). 
Children can be referred for a neuropsychological assessment from a number of 
different sources including their Primary Care Physician/Pediatrician, School District, 
Psychiatrist, Mental Health Therapist, or through self-referral. To be included in the 
study each participant has a Full Scale IQ score in the borderline range or higher (FSIQ ≥ 
70).  Children receiving scores in the mental retardation range (FSIQ ≤ 69) were 
excluded from this study in order to control for skill dysfunction due to global cognitive 
deficit.   
The majority of children referred for evaluation to the Allegheny General 
Hospital Department of Psychiatry are males. In part because of this disparity, gender 
differences were not investigated. Previous studies have found relatively few sex 
differences on measures of executive functioning (Davies & Rose, 1999), and it seems 
that both girls and boys develop executive functioning skills at similar rates (Anderson, 
2002). Davies and Rose (1999) found that differences in executive functioning between 
males and females were related to some visual spatial tasks, but these differences 
depended on the type of visual spatial task administered. 
3.2. Measures 
Standardized assessments that were used for this study include the Wechsler 
Intelligence Scale for Children, Fourth Ed. (WISC-IV) and Conners’ Continuous 
Performance Test (CPT-II). The study participants represented the norm group 
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characteristics of each test in terms of age, gender, geographic location, and ethnic 
background. The tests were selected from a comprehensive battery of tests given to 
children referred for neuropsychological assessment to determine etiological factors. 
They are considered valid and reliable estimates of the corresponding abilities measured. 
3.2.1. Conners’ Continuous Performance Test, 2nd Ed. (CPT-II)  
The CPT-II is a computer administered test measuring attention to task, vigilance 
(sustained attention), and the ability to inhibit motor response (Conners & MHS Staff, 
2002). The test requires a respondent to press a space bar or mouse button when any 
letter appears except the letter “X”. The inter-stimulus interval changes randomly through 
six time blocks based on a person’s performance versus average response times. The test 
lasts for 14 minutes with no break.  This assessment can be administered to individuals 
six years of age and older (Conners & MHS Staff, 2002).  
Five scores from the CPT-II were analyzed in this study as observed variables of 
executive control and attention: Omission Errors, Commission Errors, Hit Reaction Time, 
Hit Reaction Time Standard Error, and Variability of Standard Error.  Barkley, Edwards, 
Laneri, Fletcher, and Metevia (2001) completed a factor analysis of tasks of executive 
functioning, temporal reward discounting, and time estimation and reproduction.  The 
factor solution identified these five variables as measuring inattention and inhibition 
(executive control), and provides support for the selection of CPT-II variables in this 
study.   
The two scores used to analyze impulsive responding (executive control) are 
number of Commissions (# of Commissions) and Hit Reaction Time (Hit RT).  
Commissions are the number of times a respondent reacts to non-target stimuli.  Hit 
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Reaction Time is the mean response time measured in milliseconds.  Low T-scores for 
Hit Reaction Time indicate a fast response time.  The response criterion and response 
speed of the individual taking the test affect their number of commissions.  Slow 
response time, in the presence of a high number of omission and commission errors 
indicates inattention, while a high number of commission errors and a fast response time 
indicate an impulsive response style (Conners & MHS Staff, 2002).    
The scores that used to measure attention are Omission Errors (# of omissions), 
Hit Reaction Time Standard Error (Hit RT SE), and Variability of Standard Error 
(Variability of SE).  Omission errors are the number of times which an examinee did not 
respond to a target item and reflects inattention to stimuli (Barkley et al., 2001).  Hit RT 
SE acts as a measure of consistency between response times.  A high degree of variability 
between response times can indicate inattentiveness (Conners & MHS Staff, 2002).  The 
measure Variability of SE also reflects variability of response times, but in contrast to Hit 
RT SE, Variability of SE indicates the inconsistency in response time with relation to an 
individual’s standard error.    
Below (Table 3.1) is a table of the Split-Half reliability coefficients from the 
CPT-II manual of the measures used in this study. 
Table 3.1  
CPT-II Split-Half reliability coefficients    
Variable Reliability 
# of Commissions r12= .83 
# of Omissions r12= .94  
Hit RT r12= .95 
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Hit RT SE r12= .87 
Variability of SE r12= .66 
r12=split-half reliability coefficients 
Also, through validity studies conducted during standardization of the CPT-II, it 
was determined that the CPT-II test discriminates accurately between ADHD and non-
ADHD groups (Conners & MHS Staff, 2002; Epstein, Erkanli, Conners, Klaric, Costello, 
& Angold, 2003).  Discriminant validity is supported by the ability of the CPT-II to 
identify correctly between clinical versus non-clinical groups.  Both the reliability and 
validity coefficients are considered within acceptable limits to account for true score and 
predictive values (Conners & MHS Staff, 2002). 
3.2.2. Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children, 4th Ed. (WISC-IV) 
In 1944 Wechsler defined intelligence as “…capacity of the individual to act 
purposefully, to think rationally, and to deal effectively with his environment.” The 
WISC-IV is the newest revision of the Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children series 
that is used as a broad measure of intelligence for children aged 6 years to 16 years, 11 
months. The WISC-IV is based on a model that states a child’s estimate of global 
functioning (Full-Scale IQ) is determined by measures of Verbal Comprehension (VCI), 
Perceptual Reasoning (PRI), Working Memory (WMI), and Processing Speed (PSI).  
The revision of the WISC brought many changes to the look and feel of the test. 
Five new subtests have been added, and four of the remaining subtests have been 
modified for improvement. The Verbal Comprehension Index subtests include: 
Similarities, Vocabulary, Comprehension, Information, and Word Reasoning. These 
subtests assess a child’s verbal abilities related to reasoning, comprehension, and 
conceptualization.  
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 The Perceptual Reasoning Index subtests include: Block Design, Picture 
Concepts, Matrix Reasoning, and Picture Completion. This index assesses perceptual 
reasoning and organization. The Perceptual Reasoning Index replaced the Performance 
Intelligence Quotient on previous versions of the WISC series, and reflects an increased 
emphasis on fluid intelligence, or the ability to manipulate novel information.  
 The Working Memory Index subtests include: Digit Span (forward and 
backward), Letter-Number Sequencing, and Arithmetic. This index assesses a child’s 
attention, concentration, and working memory. It replaced the Freedom from 
Distractibility Index on previous versions of the WISC series.  
 The Processing Speed Index measures a child’s speed of processing for mental 
and graphomotor tasks. The subtests for this index include: Coding, Symbol Search, and 
Cancellation.  
 The WISC-IV allows for a wide range of interpretation, from indices measuring a 
variety of a child’s skills, such as the global Full Scale Intelligence Quotient; to the small 
detail provided though process analysis of individual responses. The WISC-IV also 
lowered test floors and raised test ceilings from previous versions. There has been the 
addition of both easier and more difficult items on all the subtests.  
Several studies have analyzed the WISC-IV in order to better understand the 
constructs it measures (Keith, Goldenring Fine, Taub, Reynolds, & Kranzler, 2006; 
Wechsler, 2003).  Wechsler (2003) compared the four WISC-IV factors (Verbal 
Comprehension, Perceptual Reasoning, Working Memory, and Processing Speed) to the 
11 domains of functioning explained by the Cattell, Horn, and Carroll (1993) theory of 
cognitive abilities (McGrew, 2003). The Gf (Fluid Reasoning), Gc (Crystallized 
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Knowledge), Gs (Processing Speed), Gv (Visual Spatial Abilities), Gsm (Short-term 
Memory), and Gq (Quantitative Knowledge), broad band domains can be identified in 
measurements included in the recent WISC revision.  However, Wechsler (2003) 
continues to delineate the WISC-IV factors as Verbal Comprehension (VC), Perceptual 
Reasoning (PR), Working Memory (WM), and Processing Speed (PS).  
The study conducted by Keith et al. (2006) further explores Wechsler’s (2003) 
analysis and challenges the current factor structure.  By using a higher order confirmatory 
factor analysis Keith et al. (2006) identified a model defined by the factors Gc, Gv, Gf, 
Gsm, and Gs.   
The following table (Table 3.2) lists the WISC-IV subtests, current index factor 
structure (Wechsler, 2003), and proposed cross-validated factor structure determined by 
Keith et al. (2006): 
Table 3.2  
WISC-IV current index factor structure 
Subtest Index Score CHC Domain(s) 
Similarities² 
Verbal Comprehension 
Index (VCI) 
Gc 
Vocabulary² VCI Gc 
Comprehension² VCI Gc 
Information VCI Gc 
Word Reasoning¹ VCI Gc 
Block Design² 
Perceptual Reasoning Index 
(PRI) 
Gv 
Picture Concepts¹,² PRI Gf 
Matrix Reasoning² PRI Gf, Gv 
Picture Completion PRI Gv, Gc 
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Digit Span² 
Working Memory Index 
(WMI) 
Gsm 
Letter-Number Sequencing² WMI Gsm 
Arithmetic WMI Gf 
Coding² 
Processing Speed Index 
(PSI) 
Gs 
Symbol Search² PSI Gs, Gv 
Cancellation¹ PSI Gs 
¹These subtests are new additions to the WISC testing series. The proposed Gf-Gc domains measured by 
these tests were determined from an analysis of similar tasks on other preexisting normed tests. 
²These subtests are considered the core subtests, and necessary to determine the Full-Scale IQ score. 
 
Scores that will be used for analysis include the scaled scores for each of the ten 
core subtests (Similarities, Vocabulary, Comprehension, Block Design, Picture Concepts, 
Matrix Reasoning, Digit Span, Letter-Number Sequencing, Coding, and Symbol Search).  
Supplemental WISC-IV subtests will not be included in this study, because they were not 
routinely administered as part of the sample subject assessment battery.  Not including 
the supplemental subtests may be a limitation of this study.  Keith et al. (2006) suggest 
using all WISC-IV subtests in order to fully understand the constructs measured.   
Below is a table (Table 3.3) of the psychometric properties of the scores used 
from the WISC-IV, which reflects both a reliable and valid measure.  
Table 3.3  
WISC-IV reliability and validity coefficients 
Variable Reliability Validity 
Block Design r1= .86 r2= .771 
Similarities r1= .86 r2= .761 
Coding r1= .85 r2= .761 
Vocabulary r1= .89 r2= .821 
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Picture Concepts r1= .82 r2= .442 
Comprehension r1= .81 r2= .621 
Digit Span r1= .87 r2= .771 
Matrix Reasoning r1= .89 r2= .692 
Letter-Number Seq. r1= .90 r2= .693 
Symbol Search r1= .79 r2= .671 
r1= internal consistency coefficient (Wechsler, 2003) 
r2= corrected correlation coefficient (Wechsler, 2003) 
1= correlated to WISC-III (Wechsler, 2003) 
2= correlated to WPPSI-III (Wechsler, 2003) 
3= correlated to WAIS-III (Wechsler, 2003) 
3.3. Procedure  
Children referred for a neuropsychological evaluation at Allegheny General 
Hospital Department of Psychiatry are routinely administered a comprehensive battery of 
neuropsychological tests, which generally includes the Wechsler Intelligence Scale for 
Children, 4th ed. and Conner’s Continuous Performance Test-II.  
Each child may also complete self report measures, including the Achenbach 
Youth Self Report, Revised Children’s Manifest Anxiety Scale, and Children’s 
Depression Inventory. In addition to individual assessments, one or both of the child’s 
parents complete several parent report measures including the Behavior Rating Inventory 
of Executive Functioning, the Achenbach Child Behavior Checklist, and a 
Neurodevelopmental History form. Each of these instruments contributes valuable 
variance when evaluating the strengths and weaknesses of children. Test choice for each 
assessment remains fluid, and may eliminate or add to the above list of tests. 
The assessment procedures for each of the cases in the database were 
administered by either a board certified neuropsychologist, psychometrist, pre- or post-
doctoral psychology intern, or psychology student trained in the administration of 
neuropsychological measures with the direct supervision of a board certified 
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neuropsychologist. All diagnostic determinations were made by a board certified 
neuropsychologist.  
3.4. Data Analysis 
This study utilizes an exploratory factor analytic design evaluating a factor 
structure proposed from 15 indicator variables. The purpose of an exploratory factor 
analysis method is to reduce a set of variables, i.e. scores on tests, to smaller number of 
latent variables (Garson, 2005). Latent variables, or factors, are those occurrences that 
cannot be directly observed (Byrne, 1998).  The latent variables hypothesized by this 
study were indicated by prior research. They include Gc, Gf, Gv, Gsm, Gs, Gat, and Gec. 
This analysis is exploratory, as opposed to confirmatory, because even though 
separate studies (Barkley, 2001; Keith et al., 2006) validate the separate Gf-Gc and 
attention factors, combining the two within one model adds method variance that cannot 
be explained as confirmatory. Factor analysis utilizes observed variables as indicators of 
the latent Gf-Gc expanded variables (Byrne, 1998) proposed in this research. Specifically, 
the SPSS computer program will be used to run the initial exploratory factor analysis. 
The initial factor analysis will set the stage for the second step of this study, which is the 
cognitive model verification. Validation of the proposed Gc, Gf, Gv, Gsm, Gs, Gat, and Gec 
constructs is needed to fully evaluate the modified Dean Woodcock Neuropsychology 
model (Dean et al., 2003) outlined in Figure 1.1. 
The structural equation modeling (SEM) approach to factor analysis will be used 
in this study to evaluate the relationship between proposed cognitive constructs. The 
AMOS computer program was used to evaluate this study’s SEM factor structure.  The 
SEM method evaluates the variance, as well as covariance, between variables (Garson, 
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2005). The link between observed variables and the underlying latent factors is 
fundamental, with regression path strengths between the variables and factors being used 
to help define the causal relationship (Byrne, 1998). Structural Equation Modeling 
utilizes both a measurement model and structural model to understanding the 
relationships between observed variables and factors, as well as between each factor. The 
measurement model represents the relationship between observed and latent variables, 
and the structural model illustrates the relationship between each of the latent variables.  
A full model combines both the structural and measurement models and provides an 
estimation of the inter- and intra-relationships between unobserved and observed 
variables (Byrne, 1998).   
The focus of the SEM approach is to determine the goodness of fit between the 
sample data and the proposed model. Byrne (1998) describes the process of fitting the 
data into the model as: Data = Model + Residual. In this case residual represents the 
discrepancy between the observed data and proposed model.   
Given that the hypothesis includes adding new Gat and Gec factors into the already 
established Gf-Gc cognitive model, the framework for testing the structural equation 
models in this study will follow the most common type of SEM called the model 
generating approach (Byrne, 1998). The model generating approach allows this study to 
propose a model based on standing theory, either reject or accept the model based on 
goodness of fit, and modify the rejected model in a way that represents a better fit to the 
data. 
Several goodness of fit statistics will be used to analyze both the Gf-Gc expanded 
model and modified Dean Woodcock Neuropsychology model, including Chi square (χ2), 
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Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA), Parsimony Comparative Fit Index 
(PCFI), and Comparative Fit Index (CFI).  The Chi square statistic is a measure of the fit 
of the covariance matrix to the restricted covariance matrix (Byrne, 1998). Relative to the 
degrees of freedom, a small χ2 indicates a good fit and a large χ2 indicates a poor fit 
(Jöreskog & Sörbom, 1993). RMSEA is a fit statistic sensitive to the complexity of the 
model being tested.  Guidelines for the RMSEA are values nearing zero; however, values 
between .05-.08 indicate good fit (Byrne, 1998).  The PCFI accounts for the number of 
estimated parameters (52 in this study) when measuring the overall fit of the 
hypothesized model.  The PCFI represents the goodness of fit of the model and the 
parsimony of the model through one statistic (Byrne, 1998). Finally, the CFI statistics 
range from 0.0 to 1.0, with values >0.90 indicating good fit (Bentler, 1992; Byrne, 1998).  
Selection of these statistics was based on prior analytic research in the areas of cognition 
(Holland et al., 2004; Keith et al., 2006).      
3.4.1 Evaluation of Assumptions 
There are several assumptions that will be tested during the course of the SEM 
statistical procedure. Sample size and missing data will be assessed. For this study there 
are 225 subjects and 15 observed variables. The sample size of 225 individuals exceeds 
the Schumacker and Lomax (1996) proposal of 10 subjects per variable. Given this 
sample will be pulled from an already existing database, and therefore subject selection 
can be more restricted, missing data is not predicted to impact this study.     
A test of normality and linearity will be conducted to determine skewness and 
kurtosis. The skewness and kurtosis statistics are used to evaluate distribution of scores. 
 69 
Ideally these statistics will be as close to zero as possible (Holland et al., 2004), however 
statistics between 0 and 1.0 can be considered acceptable (Huck & Cormier, 1996).  
An additional assumption is that the constructs in this study previously held up 
across age ranges (Conners & MHS Staff, 2002; Wechsler, 2003). This study will 
evaluate whether this remains true for the current sample by measuring age continuously. 
A continuous correlations test will be done to investigate developmental implications of 
construct measurement.  
3.4.2 Variables and Models 
This study’s hypothesis identifies two separate models: the first is a seven factor 
model reflecting the inclusion of Gat and Gec into the Gf-Gc cognitive structure; and the 
second model fits the seven factors into a reciprocal processing hierarchy to test the 
relationship between factors.   
The hypothesized seven factor model (Figure 3.1) identifies Gf (matrix reasoning 
and picture concepts as indicators), Gc (similarities, vocabulary, and comprehension as 
indicators), Gv (matrix reasoning and block design as indicators), Gsm (letter-number 
sequencing and digit span as indicators), Gs (Coding and symbol search as indicators), Gat 
(# of Omissions, Hit RT SE, and Variability of SE), and Gec (# of commissions and Hit 
RT as indicators) as factors measured by the 15 variables.  This model being presented 
questions whether a seven factor model fits the data.  
Each separate construct will be measured by the specified measurement variables. 
The model represents an organization of cognitive constructs that are measured by subtest 
scores on the WISC-IV and CPT-II. Note the arrows from each construct (circle) pointing 
to corresponding measurement variables (box). The arrow represents variance. This 
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proposed model has each construct measured by at least 2 variables. Also, with the 
exception of Matrix Reasoning loading on both Gf and Gv, each variable loads on one 
construct.  
Figure 3.1 Hypothesized seven factor model including Gf-Gc components, Gat, and Gec 
 
A check of identifiability (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001) indicates that the seven 
factor Gf-Gc expanded model proposed in this study is over-identified, and therefore able 
to be solved uniquely (Stevens, 2002). There are 120 identified data points (with 15 
variables, 15(15+1)/2=120 data points). The model hypothesized includes 52 parameters 
to be estimated (15 regression coefficients, 21 covariances, and 16 variances). Therefore, 
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with 68 degrees of freedom (120-52) the model is over-identified (Tabachnick & Fidell, 
2001).   
The second model (Figure 3.2) reflects a modified version of the Dean et al. 
(2003) representation of the Dean-Woodcock Neuropsychology Model. This model 
proposes a process between attention, conscious awareness/short term memory, fluid 
reasoning, visual spatial ability, crystallized intelligence, processing speed, and executive 
control.   
Recall the explanation of the Dean et al. (2003) model posed in Chapter 2. Dean 
et al. (2003) advocate for a hierarchy of skills within an information processing model.  
The executive control system acts as a gatekeeper directing the path of automatic versus 
non-automatic/novel processes. This system is also responsible for allocation of attention 
and monitoring of performance. The addition of attention as a separate factor in the 
modified model shown below (Figure 3.2) reflects Luria’s (1973) contention that an 
attention system must first be on-line in order for subsequent mental processes to occur. 
The arrows in this diagram reflect how well one factor predicts another (Holland et al., 
2004), which inherently helps determine the relationship between the constructs. 
Figure 3.2 illustrates a cognitive structure explained by a process between 
component skills. Attention directly affects short term memory, which in turn affects the 
ability to complete tasks requiring processing speed, fluid reasoning, and visual-spatial 
skills. Fluid skills and visual spatial skills affect the processing of stored knowledge, 
which processes simultaneously through executive control. The executive control 
component is affected by how quickly information can be processed. Figure 3.2 explains 
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task completion and skill delivery from beginning (primary skill) to completion 
(product).  
Figure 3.2 Modified Dean Woodcock Neuropsychology model, with attention added as a 
primary component. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Gec= Executive Control 
Gs=  Processing Speed 
Gat=  Attention 
Gsm=  Short Term Memory/Conscious Awareness 
Gf=  Fluid Intelligence 
Gv=  Visual Spatial Ability 
Gc=  Crystallized Intelligence 
3.4.3. Research Questions 
1. Are there additional components, in addition to Gf-Gc, that further explain 
cognitive functioning and processes? Confirming data would include the 
components Gf, Gc, Gs, Gv, and Gsm delineated in the Keith et al (2006) 
literature, with the addition of attention (Gat) and executive control (Gec).  
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Gv 
 
Gf Stores of 
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Gs 
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a. Does executive control constitute a separate construct than is 
accounted for and measured by cognitive tests of Gf-Gc theory?  
b. Does attention constitute a separate construct than is accounted for and 
measured by cognitive tests of Gf-Gc theory? 
2. What is the structure of the relationship between attention, executive control, 
and CHC stratum II components measured by the WISC-IV? This model will 
be dependent first on verification of the presence of attention and executive 
control in research question #1. The second step of this question is dependent 
on the hypothesis that the components fit a model that is represented by 
Figure 3.2, with respect to Gf-Gc, and attention and executive control.  
a. Does the Dean Woodcock Neuropsychology Model (Dean et al, 2003) 
accurately represent the relationship between cognitive components?  
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CHAPTER 4 
RESULTS 
 
The main objective of the current study is to explore the possibility of a higher 
order processing relationship between cognitive skills that includes Gf-Gc Components 
Processing Speed, Short Term Memory/Conscious Awareness, Fluid Intelligence, Visual 
Spatial Ability, and Crystallized Intelligence, as well as executive control and attention.  
A description of the study’s variables will first be presented, followed by summarization 
of research questions and the corresponding results. Factor analytic and structural 
equation modeling procedures will be reviewed as they answer each of the research 
questions.  
4.1. Descriptive Statistics 
 The statistics describing the study sample are presented in Table 4.1.  A majority 
of the respondents were male (71.6%) and were Caucasian (86.2%).  Age in months of 
children tested ranged from 74 to 208. The mean age of children tested was 130.16 
months (SD = 33.74).   
The means and standard deviations for the fifteen indicator variables are 
presented in Table 4.2.  The skewness and kurtosis of the distribution of these variables 
are also presented in Table 4.2. As referred to in this table, the WISC-IV Letter Number 
Sequencing had a high kurtosis value.  The CPT-II Number of Omissions variable had 
very high skew and kurtosis values.  All other variables had acceptable skew and kurtosis 
values. 
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Table 4.1  
Descriptive Statistics of Study Sample (N = 225) 
Variables Frequency Percentage 
Sex 
 Male 
 Female 
Ethnicity 
 Caucasian 
 Other 
 
161 
64 
 
194 
31 
 
71.6 
28.4 
 
86.2 
13.8 
 
The correlations between the indicator variables are presented in Table 4.3.  The 
WISC-IV subtests were generally correlated with each other.  Only the Similarities and 
Vocabulary subtests were not significantly correlated with the Coding subtest.  The 
WISC-IV subtests were correlated with four of the five the CPT-II measures.  The WISC-
IV subtests were generally not significantly related to the Number of Commissions.   
 Correlations between Age and the indicator variables were completed in order to 
investigate the stability of the constructs across age. Since age was not presented 
categorically, meaning in set age ranges, a continuous test was performed. Pearson 
correlations were conducted. If variable 1 is measured on an interval/ratio scale and 
variable 2 is measured on an interval/ratio scale – as age and the IQ tests were, then the 
Pearson r procedure is used (Garson, 2008). A continuous test measures the correlations 
of each test repeatedly cross ages, thus giving an indication as to developmental stability. 
The results are presented in Table 4.4.  
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 Table 4.4 shows correlational significance across age for Vocabulary, Letter-
Number Sequencing, Number of Omissions, Hit RT, Hit RT SE, and Variability of SE. 
The directionality and strength of the correlations between age and indicator variables in 
this situation indicate that older children tended to have better developed abilities on 
those tests. Of note, based on these findings attention seems to improve with age, which 
corresponds to contemporary understanding of the development of attention (Conners & 
MHS Staff, 2002; Lezak, 1995). As age increases, the number of omissions and 
inconsistency in response time decrease in this sample. Given that decreases in both of 
these scores indicate better attention (Conners & MHS Staff, 2002); this finding reflects 
an improvement in attention that occurs developmentally as age increases.  
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Table 4.2  
Descriptive Statistics for Indicator Variables, Part One (N = 225) 
Variable Range Mean SD Skewness 
Statistic 
Skewness Std. 
Error 
Kurtosis Statistic Kurtosis Std. 
Error 
WISC-IV 
 Similarities 
 Vocabulary 
 Comprehension 
 Block design 
 Picture concepts 
 Matrix reasoning 
 Digit span 
 Letter-number sequencing 
 Coding 
 Symbol search 
 
1 to 18 
3 to 16 
1 to 15 
1 to 19 
1 to 18 
2 to 18 
2 to 16 
1 to 19 
1 to 17 
1 to 15 
 
9.88 
9.26 
8.86 
9.45 
10.56 
9.57 
8.85 
9.01 
7.93 
8.96 
 
2.89 
2.58 
2.73 
2.90 
2.78 
2.70 
2.76 
2.78 
2.94 
2.89 
 
-.16 
.13 
-.19 
.09 
-.37 
.07 
.18 
-.37 
.09 
-.50 
 
.16 
.16 
.16 
.16 
.16 
.16 
.16 
.16 
.16 
.16 
 
-.01 
-.35 
-.03 
.11 
.80 
.08 
-.39 
1.54 
-.22 
.31 
 
.32 
.32 
.32 
.32 
.32 
.32 
.32 
.32 
.32 
.32 
CPT-II 
 Number of omissions 
 Number of commissions 
 Hit RT 
 Hit RT SE 
 Variability of SE 
 
34 to 117 
23 to 72 
21 to 79 
25 to 82 
24 to 72 
 
51.48 
52.54 
46.89 
51.25 
51.09 
 
11.59 
9.95 
11.49 
10.70 
10.45 
 
2.14 
-.54 
.51 
-.04 
-.19 
 
.16 
.16 
.16 
.16 
.16 
 
6.18 
-.28 
.00 
-.44 
-.77 
 
.32 
.32 
.32 
.32 
.32 
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Table 4.3  
Correlations between Indicator Variables 
Variable V1 V2 V3 V4 V5 V6 V7 V8 V9 V10 V11 V12 V13 V14 
W Similarities (V1) 
W Vocabulary (V2) 
W Comprehension (V3) 
W Block (V4) 
W Picture (V5) 
W Matrix (V6) 
W Digit (V7) 
W Letter (V8) 
W Coding (V9) 
W Symbol (V10) 
CPT Omissions (V11) 
CPT Commissions (V12) 
CPT Hit (V13) 
CPT HitSE (V14) 
CPT Variability (V15) 
 
.64** 
.53** 
.35** 
.39** 
.35** 
.36** 
.33** 
.11 
.26** 
-.27** 
.05 
-.22** 
-.22** 
-.21** 
 
 
.63** 
.35** 
.39** 
.41** 
.33** 
.35** 
.13 
.22** 
-.22** 
-.06 
-.22** 
-.29** 
-.27** 
 
 
 
.20** 
.30** 
.27** 
.32** 
.34** 
.17* 
.23** 
-.19** 
-.09 
-.16* 
-.28** 
-.30** 
 
 
 
 
.25** 
.41** 
.16* 
.20** 
.27** 
.33** 
-.12 
-.11 
-.09 
-.10 
-.08 
 
 
 
 
 
.36** 
.32** 
.27** 
.21** 
.16* 
-.29** 
-.09 
-.16* 
-.20** 
-.19** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.27** 
.26** 
.09 
.16* 
-.29** 
-.16* 
-.15* 
-.28** 
-.31** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.29** 
.11 
.14* 
-.25** 
-.11 
-.15* 
-.22** 
-.23** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.21** 
.25** 
-.25** 
-.05 
-.19** 
-.25** 
-.20** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.55** 
-.08 
-.14* 
-.17* 
-.16* 
-.15* 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-.11 
-.07 
-.21** 
-.17** 
-.15* 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.05 
.40** 
.60** 
.59** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-.41** 
.09 
.19** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.71** 
.52** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.94** 
* Significant at .05 
** Significant at .01 
W = WISC-IV 
CPT = CPT-II 
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Table 4.4  
Correlations between Age and Indicator Variables (N = 225) 
Indicator Variable Age 
WISC Similarities 
WISC Vocabulary  
WISC Comprehension  
WISC Block Design 
WISC Picture Concepts  
WISC Matrix Reasoning 
WISC Digit Span 
WISC Letter-Number  
WISC Coding  
WISC Symbol Search 
CPT # of Omissions  
CPT # of Commissions  
CPT Hit RT 
CPT Hit RT SE 
CPT Variability of SE 
.095 
.145* 
.065 
.038 
.125 
.118 
-.029 
.181** 
-.121 
-.029 
-.288** 
.024 
-.387** 
-.368** 
-.283** 
* Significant at .05 
** Significant at .01 
4.2. Research Question 1 
1. Are there additional components, in addition to Gf-Gc, that further explain 
cognitive functioning and processes? Confirming data would include the 
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components Gf, Gc, Gs, Gv, and Gsm delineated in the Keith et al (2006) literature, 
with the addition of attention (Gat) and executive control (Gec).  
a. Does executive control constitute a separate construct than is accounted 
for and measured by cognitive tests of Gf-Gc theory?  
b. Does attention constitute a separate construct than is accounted for and 
measured by cognitive tests of Gf-Gc theory? 
4.3. Exploratory Factor Analysis 
 An exploratory factor analytic procedure was conducted to test whether the 
WISC-IV subtests and the CPT-II measures would yield the 7 hypothesized components 
shown in Figure 3.1.  The extraction method specified was principal components analysis 
(PCA) and the rotation method requested was an orthogonal Varimax rotation. Principle 
components analysis was used because it assumes unique variance of components, versus 
elimination of unique variance as in procedures such as Principal axis factor analysis 
(PAF) (Fabrigar, Wegener, MacCallum, & Strahan, 1999; Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001). 
Due to the nature of the separation of cognitive skills outlined in the literature (Keith et 
al., 2006; Meyer & Kieras, 1997; Naglieri, Goldstein, Delauder, & Schwebach, 2005; 
Norman & Shallice, 1986; Phelps et al., 2005), exclusion of unique variance was thought 
to be a shortcoming of the PAF procedure for use in this study; therefore, PCA was 
chosen as a more appropriate factor analysis method. 
Orthogonal Varimax rotation was selected because it assumes that the variables 
are uncorrelated and maximizes large loadings (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001). Varimax 
indicates that each component has a few large loadings and more loadings of zero. This 
simplifies interpretation because after Varimax each original variable tends to be 
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associated with one (or small #) of components, and each components represents only a 
small # of variables (Abdi, 2003; Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001). Literature review for this 
study supports orthogonal rotation because of the distinct separation of cognitive 
components (Keith et al., 2006; Phelps et al., 2005), executive control, and attention 
(Meyer & Kieras, 1997; Naglieri, Goldstein, Delauder, & Schwebach, 2005; Norman & 
Shallice, 1986). 
 The PCA analysis yielded four components, accounting for 62.99% of the 
variance. The eigenvalues and the variance explained by each of the components are 
presented in Table 4.5.  The components and their corresponding variables are presented 
in Table 4.6. The criterion for eigenvalue selection was set at the default value of 1. 
Table 4.5  
Variance Explained by Resulting Components 
Component Eigenvalue  Eigenvalue % of 
Variance 
1 
2 
3 
4 
4.68 
2.03 
1.42 
1.32 
31.22 
13.50 
9.46 
8.81 
  
As can be seen in Table 4.6, the first component consists primarily of the WISC-
IV subtests.  The Similarities, Vocabulary, and Comprehension subtests loaded highly 
onto the first component.  The Picture Concepts, Matrix Reasoning, Digit Span, and 
Letter Number Sequencing subtests loaded moderately onto the first component.  
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Accordingly, this component could be labeled as a combined Gf-Gc, including both Fluid 
and Crystallized abilities.   
Table 4.6  
Indicator Variable Loadings (Rotated Matrix) 
Variable Component 
 1 2 3 4 
WISC Similarities 
WISC Vocabulary  
WISC Comprehension  
WISC Block Design  
WISC Picture Concepts  
WISC Matrix Reasoning 
WISC Digit Span 
WISC Letter-Number  
WISC Coding  
WISC Symbol Search 
CPT # of Omissions  
CPT # of Commissions  
CPT Hit RT 
CPT Hit RT SE  
CPT Variability of SE 
.80 
.82 
.71 
.45 
.58 
.57 
.55 
.48 
.05 
.18 
-.25 
-.06 
-.11 
-.17 
-.18 
-.06 
-.11 
-.13 
.05 
-.14 
-.23 
-.18 
-.17 
-.10 
-.07 
.72 
.08 
.68 
.95 
.92 
.09 
.07 
.08 
.45 
.12 
.07 
.00 
.25 
.86 
.83 
.01 
-.10 
-.18 
-.10 
-.06 
.19 
.07 
.03 
-.10 
-.08 
-.24 
-.10 
.02 
-.07 
.06 
.04 
.93 
-.60 
-.04 
.12 
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 The second component consists primarily of four CPT-II measures: number of 
Omissions, Hit RT, Hit RT SE, and Variability of SE.  The HIT RT SE and Variability of 
SE loaded highly onto this component, and the number of Omissions and HIT RT loaded 
moderately onto this component. Recall, number of Omissions, Hit RT SE, and 
Variability of SE were proposed as CPT-II subtests measuring attention.  Accordingly, 
this component could be labeled Gat, Attention. 
 Both the Symbol Search and Coding subtests load highly onto the third 
component.  Accordingly, this component could be labeled Gs, Processing Speed. 
 The fourth component includes only one CPT-II measure with a high loading, the 
Number of Commissions.  However, Hit RT also loaded moderately on this component.  
This supports Component 4 as the executive control component, because while a high # 
of commissions indicates impulsivity (lack of executive control), a low Hit RT also 
indicates impulsivity (-.60). In addition, a high HIT RT may indicate attentiveness, but 
only in conjunction with other scores being either high or low.  So the Hit RT may be 
more accurately interpreted on component 4 (Gec) rather than component 2 (Gat). 
Containing both number of Commissions and Hit RT, this component could be labeled 
Gec, Executive Control. 
Although the results do not correspond with previous findings of a five-
component model of cognition including Processing Speed, Short Term 
Memory/Conscious Awareness, Fluid Intelligence, Visual Spatial Ability, and 
Crystallized Intelligence (Keith et al, 2006), the results provide partial evidence that 
Attention and Executive Control constitute two components separate from traditional Gf-
Gc structure. However, because Hit RT did not load significantly onto component 4, it 
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will be eliminated from the structural equation model in order to maximize statistical fit. 
Therefore, the component Gec cannot be analyzed in the structural equation model 
because it cannot be statistically defined as a component since it is the only variable 
which shows a significant relationship with Gec. 
4.4. Research Question 2 
2. What is the structure of the relationship between attention, executive control, and 
Gf-Gc stratum II components measured by the WISC-IV? This model will be 
dependent first on verification of the presence of attention and executive control 
in research question #1. The second step of this question is dependent on the 
hypothesis that the components fit a model that is represented by Figure 3.2, with 
respect to Gf-Gc, and attention and executive control.  
a. Does the Dean Woodcock Neuropsychology Model (Dean et al, 2003) 
accurately represent the relationship between cognitive components?  
4.5. Relationships between the Constructs 
 Structural equation modeling procedures were conducted to examine the 
relationships between the four hypothesized constructs, with Attention and Executive 
Control added. However, because the component Gec was not statistically identified with 
at least two indicator variables, rather only through clinical interpretation, it was not fully 
represented in the SEM as a separate factor.  
EFA Model One (Figure 4.1) tested the relationship between the components 
represented by all WISC-IV subtests and CPT-II sub-scores number of omissions, 
number of commissions, and variability of SE. EFA Model Two (Figure 4.2) included 
only the WISC-IV subtests that loaded highly onto the first component, but kept the other 
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components the same as Model One. Note that Hit RT and Hit RT SE were omitted from 
analyses, because the variance of the error was negative, and thus, the solution generated 
was “inadmissible.”  
The model presented in Figure 4.1 did not fit the data very well: χ2 = 153.492 (df 
= 62), p = .000, CFI = .876, PCFI = .697, and RMSEA = .081.  The CFI index was below 
the acceptable benchmark of .90 and the RMSEA value of .08 indicates moderate fit (Hu 
& Bentler, 1999).  
The indicator variables were all significantly correlated to their constructs.  Only 
one of four standardized path coefficients was statistically significant. In particular, Gat 
was significantly related to Gs (r = -.28, p = .05). The path coefficient between Gs and Gec 
was not significant. Similarly, the path coefficients between Gec and Gf-Gc were not 
significant. 
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Figure 4.1 Results for EFA Model One 
 
 
 
 Gf-Gc 
Gs 
Gat 
Matrix Reasoning 
Picture Concepts 
 
Similarities 
Comprehension 
Gec 
Omissions 
Variability of SE 
Digit Span 
LN Sequencing 
Coding Symbol Search 
  * Significant at .05   
** Significant at .01 
.65** 
.91** 
.47** 
.51** 
.51** 
.46** 
.79** 
.68** 
-1.70 
3.75 
-2.88 
.82** 
.70** 
.76** 
-.28* 
Block Design 
.45** 
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Figure 4.2 Results for EFA Model Two 
 
 
 
 Gf-Gc 
Gs 
Gat 
Vocabulary 
Similarities 
Comprehension 
Gec 
Omissions 
Variability of SE 
Coding Symbol Search 
  * Significant at .05   
** Significant at .01 
.63** 
.93** 
.79** 
.68** 
-1.09 
2.73 
-2.44 
.86** 
.74** 
.74** 
-.26* 
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 The three-component model presented in Figure 4.2 fit the data well: χ2 = 46.261 
(df = 17), p = .000, CFI = .937, PCFI = .569, and RMSEA = .088.  The CFI index was 
above the acceptable benchmark of .90; however, the RMSEA of .088 is slightly above 
an acceptable range of values of .05-.08 for moderate fit (Hu & Bentler, 1999). A higher 
RMSEA value reflects a larger difference between the estimated model and actual model 
determined by the analysis.  
The indicator variables were all significantly correlated to their constructs.  Only 
one of four standardized path coefficients was statistically significant.  In particular, Gat 
was significantly related to Gs (r = -.26, p = .05).  The path coefficient between Gs and 
Gec was not significant.  Similarly, the path coefficients between Gec and Gf-Gc were not 
significant. 
4.6. Summary for Structural Equation Model Results 
 The model that fit the data best was the three component model presented in 
Figure 4.2.  But given that models with fewer parameters generally fit data better, it is 
difficult to conclude which model accurately represents a hierarchical model of cognitive 
functioning.   
 Also, the models described in this research have never been tested with the 
addition of attention and executive control components. A model including all of the 
WISC-IV cognitive components (Processing Speed, Short Term Memory/Conscious 
Awareness, Fluid Intelligence, Visual Spatial Ability, and Crystallized Intelligence) has 
been verified through other intelligence research literature (Keith et al., 2006), but the 
presence of the additional attention and executive functioning components is suggested in 
this research through the results of the factor analytic procedure.  
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CHAPTER 5 
DISCUSSION 
 
5.1 Purpose 
The purpose of this study is to continue investigation of the Gf-Gc theory and 
expand the Keith et al. (2006) validation of Gf-Gc measurement by the WISC-IV. This 
study explored the inclusion of a new Executive Control (Gec) component and a separate 
attention component (Gat) within the Gf-Gc theory. This study involves an investigation of 
the Gf-Gc domains measured by Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children, 4th Edition 
(WISC-IV) and Conners’ Continuous Performance Test, 2nd Edition (CPT-II). These 
domains were compared via principal components analysis of the WISC-IV and CPT-II.  
Also, the relationship of these cognitive components was examined. The second 
main purpose of this research is to test the structure of the Dean-Woodcock 
Neuropsychology Model (Dean et al., 2003).  The inclusion of Gec and Gat components 
questions the primacy of each component within the Dean-Woodcock (2003) model.  
Analysis of the cognitive domains measured by the WISC-IV, and attention and 
executive control, as measured by the CPT-II, shed light on the relationship between 
executive control, attention, and measures of cognitive ability in children. 
5.2 Summary and Results of Research Question 1 
1. Are there additional components, in addition to Gf-Gc, that further explain 
cognitive functioning and processes? Confirming data would include the 
components Gf, Gc, Gs, Gv, and Gsm delineated in the Keith et al (2006) literature, 
with the addition of attention (Gat) and executive control (Gec).  
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a. Does executive control constitute a separate construct than is accounted for 
and measured by cognitive tests of Gf-Gc theory?  
b. Does attention constitute a separate construct than is accounted for and 
measured by cognitive tests of Gf-Gc theory? 
Results of this exploratory factor analysis indicate the combination of WISC-IV 
and CPT-II measure four separate components of cognitive skill. The first component 
was labeled as Gf/Gc, as it includes combined crystallized and fluid reasoning skills 
(Keith et al., 2006). The second component was labeled Gat representing the attention as 
measured by the CPT-II. The third component represents speed of information processing 
and will be labeled Gs. The final component, measured by two CPT-II scores that indicate 
impulsive responding, was labeled as Gec as a measure of executive control.   
 Although the exploratory factor analysis results do not support previous findings 
of five-component cognitive functioning model (Keith et al., 2006), the results provide 
partial evidence that Attention and Executive Control constitute two components separate 
from traditional Gf-Gc structure, as will be discussed further in the conclusions section of 
this chapter.  
5.3. Summary and Results of Research Question 2 
2. What is the structure of the relationship between attention, executive control, and 
CHC stratum II components measured by the WISC-IV? This model will be 
dependent first on verification of the presence of attention and executive control 
in research question #1. The second step of this question is dependent on the 
hypothesis that the components fit a model that is represented by Figure 3.2, with 
respect to Gf-Gc, and attention and executive control.  
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a. Does the Dean Woodcock Neuropsychology Model (Dean et al, 2003) 
accurately represent the relationship between cognitive components?  
Structural Equation Modeling was used to answer the second research question. 
This analysis took the identified four components: fluid reasoning/crystallized ability, 
processing speed, attention, and executive control, and investigated possible reciprocal 
relationship between the cognitive skills. Results of this analysis provide limited evidence 
for a structure in which attention assumes a role of primacy, followed by speed of 
processing, and finally a reciprocal relationship between executive control and 
crystallized ability/fluid reasoning. However, since only the relationship between 
attention and processing speed was statistically significant, the entire model of cognition 
cannot be assumed.  
As described in Chapter 4, the model presented in Figure 4.2 fit the data best, but 
given that models with fewer parameters generally fit data better, it is difficult to 
conclude whether this model accurately represents a hierarchical model of intelligence. In 
addition, although a model including Processing Speed, Short Term Memory/Conscious 
Awareness, Fluid Intelligence, Visual Spatial Ability, and Crystallized Intelligence has 
been verified through other cognitive ability research literature (Keith et al., 2006), the 
presence of the additional attention and executive control factors has never been tested. 
Based on this research, there is not enough evidence to disconfirm that 
components of the Dean Woodcock Neuropsychology Model accurately explain 
cognitive skill relationships. Attention was identified as a primary skill necessary for the 
initiation of other cognitive abilities; however, the full intact model could not be 
evaluated. 
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5.4. Conclusions 
5.4.1. Attention and Executive Control as Separate Functions 
The research literature for this study supported the separation of attention and 
executive control as distinct cognitive skills. Multiple studies have analyzed the 
relationship between cognitive functioning (Duff, Schoenberg, Scott, & Adams, 2005; 
Floyd, Bergeron, & Hamilton, 2005; Keith, Goldenring Fine, Taub, Reynolds, & 
Kranzler, 2006; Naglieri, Goldstein, Delauder, & Schwebach, 2005; Wechsler, 2003), 
attention, and various executive abilities. However, a gap in the literature was noted with 
regard to a lack of examination of a higher order processing relationship between 
cognitive skills that includes all of the current Gf-Gc components, notably executive 
control and attention. 
The current study suggests the addition of separate attention (Gat) and executive 
control (Gec) components within a Gf-Gc cognitive model. These findings are in line with 
the conclusions of several studies (Luria, 1973; Naglieri et al., 2005) that indicate the 
presence of a separate attention system. The principal components procedure identified 
attention and makes it distinct from other cognitive skills. This is in contrast to Gf-Gc 
studies (McGrew, 2003; McGrew & Flanagan, 1998; Keith et al., 2006) in which 
attention was not indicated separately.  
In addition, the current study provides partial evidence for the separation of 
executive control (Gec) from attention and other component cognitive skills. In 
conjunction with previous research (Busch, Booth, McBride, Vanderploeg, Curtiss, & 
Duchnick, 2005; Duff, Schoenberg, Scott, & Adams, 2005; Norman & Shallice, 1986; 
Minshew et al., 2002), Gec and Gat constitute distinct cognitive skills, and as such should 
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be evaluated separately. Data backs Gec as separate factor; however, because of study 
limitations this assertion must be retested.  
The analysis of Gec for this study lies more in test interpretation rather than 
statistical fit. That is, the presence of Gec was indicated in this study by clinical 
interpretation of the relationships between specific CPT-II subtests. Test development 
sets precedent for such interpretation (Conners & MHS Staff, 2002). Recall from Chapter 
4, “…Component 4 as the executive control component, because while a high # of 
commissions indicates impulsivity (lack of executive control), a low Hit RT also 
indicates impulsivity (-.60). In addition, a high HIT RT may indicate attentiveness, but 
only in conjunction with other scores being either high or low. So the Hit RT may be 
more accurately interpreted on Gec rather than Gat. Containing both number of 
Commissions and Hit RT, this component could be labeled Gec, Executive Control.” 
However, caution is recommended when interpreting this finding, because Hit RT was 
omitted from the following SEM analysis due to the variance of the error being negative. 
Thus, the solution generated for a structural model including Hit RT was “inadmissible. 
5.4.2. Relationship between Cognitive Skills 
 The processing approach to cognition proposed in this research was not fully 
validated. This is in contrast to multiple previous studies validating a similar model of 
cognitive processing (Das, Naglieri, & Kirby, 1994; Dean et al., 2003; Kaufman & 
Kaufman, 2004; Naglieri, 1999; Reitan, 1988). The best-fit model of cognitive processing 
(Figure 4.2) shows that the only significant statistical correlation is between attention and 
processing speed. The process between Gf-Gc cognitive skills, executive control, and 
processing speed was not statistically significant, and as such did not validate a 
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meaningful relationship using statistics alone. However, it is noted that this interpretation 
should be made with caution. Because the component Gec was not statistically identified 
with at least two indicator variables, rather only through clinical interpretation, it was not 
fully represented in the SEM as a separate factor. This shortcoming likely affected the 
model’s overall stability.  
 Although the model proposed by Dean et al. (2003) was not validated, the 
presence of a significant correlation between attention and processing speed shows partial 
support for an interactive relationship between cognitive skills as described in previous 
research (Luria, 1973; Das, Naglieri, & Kirby, 1994; Kaufman & Kaufman, 2004; 
Naglieri et al., 2005). This evidence is significant in that it shows attention as a necessary 
skill for other resulting cognitive processes. This finding is in line with previous 
literature, which outlines the possible primacy of attention and the hierarchical nature of 
cognitive skills (Luria, 1973; Reitan, 1988; Das, Naglieri, & Kirby, 1994; Naglieri, 1999; 
Dean et al., 2003; Kaufman & Kaufman, 2004).  
Speculation based on these findings would point to the importance of measuring 
attention ability prior to coming to conclusion about cognitive functioning based on 
standard IQ testing. These results indicate a dependent relationship between one’s ability 
to attend and one’s ability to complete any task requiring speed of information 
processing. In conjunction with Dean et al.’s (2003) model expanding processing speed 
to all other Gf-Gc abilities, one could then hypothesize, based on these findings, that 
attention interacts with the remaining abilities outlined in the literature (Dean et al., 2003; 
Keith et al., 2006). 
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5.5. Limitations 
The first limitation of this study is the lack of cultural and sex diversity of the 
sample, as well as the lack of a non-referred peer group. Although the sample size was 
adequate for analysis, the population was clinically referred for cognitive, mental health, 
or neuro-biological concerns. In addition, the sample consisted of primarily white males. 
A study of this population versus a population of similar aged non-referred peers would 
help determine whether the cognitive skills assessed presented differently given disability 
and across gender and culture. 
Another limitation of this study is that it assumes good performances on tasks 
measuring attention and executive control abilities at a young age are synonymous with 
good performances at older ages. Recall from Chapter 4, “Table 4.4 shows significance 
mean differences across age for Vocabulary, Letter-Number Sequencing, Number of 
Omissions, Hit RT, Hit RT SE, and Variability of SE. Significance in this situation 
indicates that older children tended to have better developed abilities on those tests. Of 
note, based on these findings attention improves with age.” This could have affected the 
outcome of this study in that age was measured continuously rather than in age 
categories, which doesn’t account for skill development and thus increase in skill 
performance as kids get older. Categorical analysis better allows researchers to analyze 
developmental skill acquisition. Future research could measure cognitive factors across 
age through a multiple confirmatory factor analytic procedure across multiple age ranges. 
The future analysis can be considered confirmatory because this study suggests the 
presence of attention and executive control in a clinically referred population.  
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An indication of these findings is that the measurement of attention and executive 
control potential should be assessed developmentally within a cognitive structure during 
childhood. Also, additional investigation of smaller age ranges may yield better age-
related construct stability, thus providing better data for developmentally related 
progress. 
5.6. Recommendations for Future Research 
The first recommendation for future research is to expand the factor analysis to 
validate the presence of a separate executive control factor. While partial evidence was 
found, this study was unable to provide the multiple variables necessary to authenticate 
Gec as a distinct component. Such research should take the form of a confirmatory, rather 
than exploratory factor analysis. Because the analysis of executive control was not yet 
validated at the time of this research an exploratory analysis was indicated. However, 
future research now has some basis by which to confirm Gec. 
Although this research did not validate the proposed cognitive structure in it’s 
entirety (i.e. the Dean-Woodcock Neuropsychology Model, 2003), the results are 
promising for future analyses. This study provides evidence for the existence of attention 
and executive control within a global Gf-Gc cognitive structure, as well as a relationship 
between attention and processing speed. The additional cognitive structure, including the 
reciprocal nature of the relationship between cognitive skills has been validated 
separately. A final recommendation for future research is to first validate executive 
control separately through confirmatory factor analysis, as stated above, and then re-
analyze the cognitive model with attention as a primary component and including 
executive control. Such a discovery could impact how professionals view the interactive 
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nature of attention, executive control, and specific cognitive skills because it would 
provide a better understanding of primacy in cognitive skill performance.  
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